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It is a privilege to write a paper in honor of Frank Hahn. Hahn was a talented economist who wrote on a 
range of topics central to macroeconomics today. He emphasized the importance of focusing on general 
equilibrium, and how this could improve our understanding relative to partial equilibrium analysis. What 
made Hahn particularly inspiring was his willingness to look at these central issues in new ways. For 
example, in A Critical Essay on Modern Macroeconomic Theory (1995) with Robert Solow, he argues that 
modern macroeconomic theory needs to put more emphasis on understanding financial markets – and 
especially failures in financial markets. Their warnings were prescient.  
This paper applies these insights from Hahn to analyze the risks inherent in current account deficits. Just 
as Hahn emphasized the need to incorporate financial variables in macroeconomic analysis, we focus on 
the role of the financial components of current account balances. These financial components are 
critically important to the dynamics of current account deficits today, due to the large magnitude of 
cross-border financial exposures and flows. These financial components can also create greater sources 
of vulnerability than trade deficits, due to the speed and scale by which financial flows and valuations 
can adjust. Just as Hahn emphasized the need to consider general equilibrium effects, we extend our 
analysis of the financial components of current accounts to consider how they interact with changes in 
global and domestic risk.  We show how these various interactions affect international financial flows 
and portfolio valuations, with their effects depending on the characteristics of a country’s portfolio and 
the nature of the shocks. Current account deficits are not always “menacing”. Instead, our analysis 
shows under what circumstances they can be “mitigating”, in the sense of providing a form of automatic 
international risk sharing that reduces certain vulnerabilities related to large current account deficits. 
We begin by discussing the potential vulnerabilities from large current account deficits. This discussion 
highlights the increased role of financial factors. Although some of these financial factors affecting a 
country’s international portfolio have been analyzed in other research, we are one of the few to 
highlight the importance of the investment income component of the current account (as well as the 
better known valuation effects on international investments).1 We then develop a unified framework to 
analyze the interrelationships between changes in risk and uncertainty (which often correspond to 
sudden stops in capital flows and current account adjustments) with these financial factors affecting 
current accounts and the corresponding dynamics in international portfolios. This framework is designed 
to be flexible and easy to adapt to different countries at different times. 
As an initial piece of this framework, we decompose the determinants of movements in international 
portfolios and the financial components of current accounts. We show the role of variables such as: the 
size of international asset and liability holdings, their currency denominations, their split between equity 
and debt, their return characteristics, and exchange rate movements. We document the importance of 
these variables to understanding current account dynamics in 10 OECD economies. Though there are 
well-documented issues related to the international financial data2 used in these examples, they are 
useful to highlight the diversity across experiences, as well as the flexibility of this framework to 
understand the cyclical and structural sources of vulnerability across countries.  
                                                          
1 Obstfeld (2012) and Borio and Disyatat (2015) also discuss the importance of financial variables in analysis of vulnerabilities 
related to current accounts. Key papers highlighting the importance of large international exposures and valuation changes are: 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006, 2012), Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Gourinchas et al. (2012), and Benetrix et al. (2015). 
2 See Zucman (2013), Lane (2014) and Curcuru, Dvorak and Warnock (2008) for issues. 
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Next, we extend this framework to show how these variables interact with increased domestic or global 
risk. Heightened risk and uncertainty – for whatever reason – can lead to sudden shifts in capital flows 
that make it difficult to finance a current account deficit and lead to painful macroeconomic 
adjustments. Heightened risk and uncertainty can also affect the exchange rate, the relative returns that 
foreign and domestic investors earn, and the valuations of any international borrowing and investments. 
The framework clearly shows which country characteristics can be stabilizing (by helping mitigate 
vulnerabilities through international risk sharing) as well as which characteristics and risk shocks are 
more likely to increase a country’s vulnerability. An application using different risk scenarios highlights 
some sharp differences that currently exist across countries, as well as several common features.  
In the first of these scenarios, which examines vulnerabilities during periods of heightened domestic 
risk, many countries in our sample have characteristics that should mitigate the adverse domestic 
effects by spreading the financial losses internationally. For example, the large size of countries’ 
liabilities (in most cases exceeding 100% of GDP) and the higher share of liabilities denominated in 
domestic currency (compared to assets), will generally improve their international investment positions 
after periods of heightened country-specific stress that correspond to currency depreciations. On the 
other hand, the countries in our sample rely more heavily on debt than equity for funding, on average, 
and debt generally provides less automatic risk sharing than equities. There is considerable cross-
country variation in how exchange rates commove with capital gains and rates of return on foreign 
liabilities, both of which are also important to assess a country’s vulnerabilities.   
In the second scenario, which examines vulnerabilities during periods of heightened global risk, there is 
even greater cross-country variation in the international portfolio characteristics which determine 
whether countries are more likely to gain or lose, on net, from international risk sharing. Countries more 
likely to experience greater international risk sharing include those: with a negative net international 
investment position (around half our sample); with riskier liabilities compared to assets (most of the 
sample); with more assets than liabilities denominated in safe haven currencies (most of the sample); 
and whose exchange rate is less correlated with returns on liabilities than with returns on assets (with 
considerable variation across the sample). Taken as a whole, the structure of these countries’ 
international portfolios would usually generate less automatic risk sharing after global risk shocks than 
after domestic risk shocks.  
At the end of the paper, we build on this framework to provide an in-depth simulation of how these 
vulnerabilities have evolved over time in one country with a large current account deficit: the United 
Kingdom. The UK’s current account deficit reached 7.0% of GDP in Q4 of 2015, the largest of the 
advanced economies, as well as for the United Kingdom in the 60 years for which data is available. This 
large current account deficit has been highlighted as a concern by a number of individuals and 
institutions.3 Applying this paper’s approach shows under which circumstances heightened risk can 
generate improvements in the UK’s international investment position and current account – even 
without any trade adjustments. Key are the interactions of the structure of the UK international 
investment portfolio with currency movements (as sterling tends to depreciate with increases in UK or 
global risk). Automatic risk sharing through the current account has historically been greater during 
periods of heightened UK risk than after heightened global risk. Estimates from an SVAR model suggest 
                                                          
3 For example, see the IMF’s annual report on the UK economy (IMF, 2016) and the BoE’s stress test of risks to the UK financial 
system related to its current account deficit (Financial Policy Committee, 2014). Also see Broadbent (2014) and Forbes (2016).  
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that these financial adjustments to changes in global and domestic risk explain a meaningful portion of 
changes in the UK’s international investment position and income flows. Even though the structure of 
the UK’s international borrowing and lending can reduce certain vulnerabilities related to its current 
account deficit, however, this is unlikely to fully mitigate the negative impact of heightened risk and 
uncertainty on the broader UK economy.  
The UK referendum on EU membership provides an example of how this framework can be used in real 
time to evaluate how a specific event interacts with a country’s international portfolio characteristics, 
and in turn, mitigates or magnifies any vulnerabilities related to the country’s current account. In June 
2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union. In the week after the vote, measures of both global 
and UK risk increased, but then global risk quickly fell back to pre-vote levels while measures of UK risk 
remained elevated.4 The framework in this paper shows that the increase in UK risk and corresponding 
sterling depreciation should provide an important form of risk-sharing by shifting some of the 
adjustment costs abroad.5 More specifically, the initial impact of the referendum is estimated to 
improve the UK’s net international investment position by roughly 25% of GDP in 2016, largely through 
sharper gains in UK holdings of foreign investments (compared to the value of foreigner’s holding of UK 
investments). This should alleviate any concerns about the sustainability of the UK’s external debt 
position. The estimates also suggest that the initial impact of the referendum is to improve the UK’s net 
international investment income (as a share of GDP) by about 0.7 percentage points due to exchange 
rate effects (holding relative returns fixed). This will reduce the UK current account deficit and 
corresponding international financing requirement, albeit only by a moderate amount relative to the 
large current account deficit. The analysis also suggests that if the vote to leave the European Union had 
continued to generate a significant increase in global risk—instead of being contained to the UK—then 
the gains to the UK through risk-sharing would have been significantly smaller.  
The remainder of this paper is divided into four parts.  Section I discusses reasons to be concerned about 
current account deficits: historic examples, the academic evidence, and the importance of financial 
factors.  Section II develops our broader framework for assessing the vulnerabilities related to current 
account deficits by simultaneously incorporating the effects of cross-border financial exposures and 
investment income.  Section III then extends this framework to analyze how increases in global and 
domestic risk could interact with these financial vulnerabilities linked to current account deficits. It 
applies the analysis to 10 OECD economies and ends with a more detailed application to the United 
Kingdom.  Section IV concludes and summarizes the main results.  
 
I. Longstanding Concerns about Current Account Deficits 
Current account deficits (and the corresponding borrowing from abroad) are a healthy outcome in many 
standard economic models.  Even a large current account deficit should not automatically be a cause for 
concern.  For example, in a standard endowment economy model, a country which experiences a 
                                                          
4 To measure global risk we use an average of the Baker et al. (2015) monthly news-based economic policy uncertainty indices 
for Europe and the US, weighted by those regions’ shares in UK foreign trade. This global uncertainty index spiked by 127% in 
June 2016 but subsided quickly in the following months, returning in August to levels lower than the ones recorded prior to the 
referendum. In contrast, the UK uncertainty index increased sharply in June, continued increasing to an all-time high in July 
before falling back in August. 
5 The sterling exchange rate index depreciated by 11% over the two weeks after the vote. 
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negative temporary shock to output (such as from a natural disaster) should borrow from abroad and 
run a current account deficit in order to smooth consumption over time.  Classical economic models 
show that an optimal allocation of global capital implies that capital should flow from developed 
economies with low marginal returns to developing economies with higher marginal returns, thereby 
generating current account deficits in the latter.  Various models incorporating demographic trends also 
show current account imbalances as an optimal solution, as countries with older populations should 
save less, drawing down assets and generating current account deficits (balanced by earlier surpluses).6   
The historical experience and academic evidence on current account deficits, however, suggests that 
they are often not benign. There are numerous examples when current account deficits – and the 
corresponding reliance on financing from abroad – created substantial challenges and made a country 
vulnerable to the demands and whims of its external creditors.7  These challenges are particularly 
apparent during periods of heightened uncertainty and risk aversion. This section first highlights some of 
those episodes when countries relying on external finance faced associated challenges and 
vulnerabilities. It then turns to the extensive economic literature pointing out the reasons why large 
current account deficits may increase a country’s vulnerability to external shocks and can entail difficult 
and painful adjustments. The section closes by highlighting how the theoretical and empirical analyses 
contained in the remainder of this paper further contribute to our understanding of these vulnerabilities 
linked to large current account deficits.   
A. Vulnerabilities Related to Current Account Deficits: Historic Examples 
One of the more poignant historic examples (especially for the UK) of how reliance on external financing 
can make a country vulnerable to changes in foreign sentiment is the Suez Crisis of 1956. The UK 
experienced moderate capital outflows from the beginning of 1956, which when combined with 
sterling’s fixed exchange rate, corresponded to a steady loss of international reserves.  The UK 
government realized this was not sustainable. In September, UK officials began conversations to draw 
financial assistance from the IMF – a plan which initially received informal support from the US (a key 
vote as it was the only country with veto power). In October the UK joined a military campaign in Egypt 
aimed at regaining control of the Suez Canal. Although the campaign met with minimal resistance in 
Egypt, it generated a strong international backlash – including from the US. The military campaign and 
international reaction increased the perceived risk of investing in the UK, sharply accelerating UK capital 
outflows and reserve losses. The UK needed immediate financial assistance to avoid a sharp devaluation. 
But now the US blocked any financial assistance from the IMF, unless the UK agreed to a full and 
immediate military withdrawal from Egypt. President Eisenhower even told his Treasury Secretary to 
make plans to sell US holdings of UK sterling bonds.8 The UK, constrained by its need to stabilize capital 
flows from abroad, quickly agreed to full withdrawal from Egypt. It immediately received a large 
financial assistance package that the IMF described as “linked to the financing of the current account”9 
and the situation stabilized. This experience highlighted the power of foreign investors over economies 
that are reliant on foreign financing.   
                                                          
6 For example, Ferrero (2010) highlights the role of productivity and demographics behind US trade imbalances. 
7 In 2006, the IMF was sufficiently concerned about these issues that it led a multilateral consultative process for which a key 
goal was reducing current account imbalances. 
8 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis  
9 Boughton (2001). Technically the UK still had a small current account surplus, but the IMF described the financing as linked to 
the leads and lags in payments linked to financing the current account. 
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More recently, investors have focused on current account balances as a proxy for a country’s reliance on 
external financing and corresponding vulnerability to any increase in risk aversion, economic uncertainty 
or deterioration in investor sentiment. The logic is straightforward: countries with large current account 
deficits need to attract large net financial flows from abroad each year in order to fund this deficit 
(without drawing on any international reserves). This relationship between current account deficits and 
country vulnerability gained substantial attention during the 1997 Asian crisis. This is captured in Figure 
1, which graphs the current account balances of 12 major Asian emerging markets in 1996 (before the 
crisis began).  The 6 countries on the left of the graph (with the largest current account deficits, in 
different shades of red) all experienced a sharp currency depreciation of over 10% in 1997 and some 
also received an emergency financial package from the IMF (in light red).  None of the six countries on 
the right (with the smaller current account deficits or surpluses), received an emergency package or 
experienced such a sharp depreciation.  Although this is clearly not a scientific study, it suggests that 
many investors believed that large current account deficits were an indication of vulnerability.  
This focus on current account deficits as a proxy for country vulnerability during periods of heightened 
risk has continued since.  During the spring of 2013, concerns increased about China’s growth and the 
US Federal Reserve Board began to discuss “tapering” its asset purchases.  Measures of global risk (such 
as the VIX) increased sharply and investors quickly withdrew capital from emerging markets.  Again, the 
sharpest capital outflows, currency depreciations, and increases in borrowing costs occurred in the 
countries with the largest current account deficits.10 Figure 2 shows this relationship between currency 
depreciations (relative to the dollar) over the most volatile period from May 1 to June 30, 2013 and 
current account balances (at the end of 2012).  The correlation is almost 70% – without even controlling 
for any other country characteristics.  Highlighting this obsession with current account deficits as a 
badge of country vulnerability, the group of major emerging markets under the sharpest investor 
scrutiny during this period earned the moniker “The Fragile Five” – despite having little in common 
other than large current account deficits and a corresponding reliance on external financing.  
But is the current account balance an appropriate proxy for assessing country vulnerability to increased 
risk and uncertainty? What are the channels through which current account deficits can correspond to 
increased vulnerabilities?  
B. Vulnerabilities Related to Current Account Deficits: A Literature Review 
Formal academic work suggests that large current account deficits and reliance on external financing 
can present risks – but these risks are more nuanced than a direct link from the size of a country’s 
current account deficit to its vulnerability. Using the framework in Obstfeld (2012), this literature 
broadly points out three (related) reasons why current account deficits may lead to vulnerabilities:11 (1) 
because they increase vulnerability to “sudden stops” in capital flows; (2) because they lead to a 
deterioration in the NIIP, which can put pressure on that country’s external debt solvency; and (3) 
because they reflect unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances that will eventually require a painful 
“reversal” in the current account.  
The first strand of literature focuses on the risks associated with the fact that large current account 
deficits need to be funded through financing from abroad (albeit for a limited period they can be funded 
                                                          
10 For more details on this episode, see Forbes (2014a). 
11 See Obstfeld (2012) for more details on this literature and these risks related to current account deficits. 
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from any accumulated reserves). This results from standard balance of payments accounting, in 
equation (1), which shows that the current account (CA) plus capital account (CAPACT) must equal the 
financial account (FINACT) for each country i at time t:  
𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡  .      (1) 
The capital account is generally quite small for most countries – and especially the advanced countries 
that will be the focus of this analysis – and so will be ignored in the rest of this paper.12  
Intuitively, any country running a current account deficit is sending more money abroad than it is 
earning – through buying imports, paying returns on past investments, or outflows of other payments 
such as remittances. The country must finance this shortfall of funding through a financial account 
surplus – i.e. net financial flows from foreigners – through means such as selling debt and equities, bank 
loans, more inward FDI, and/or selling accumulated international reserves. Domestic or external shocks 
can cause a “sudden stop” in this external funding (whether due to domestic or external factors), 
leading to tighter financial conditions, reduced availability of credit, increased borrowing costs, asset 
market declines, and currency depreciations (for countries with flexible rates). In extreme cases, a 
“sudden stop” can spark a currency crisis or broader financial crisis – with a sharp devaluation and 
increase in bank collapses, corporate insolvencies and debt defaults. These situations generally occur in 
an environment of sharply slower growth, reduced consumption and investment, a sharp fall in real 
wages, and often high inflation (due to the currency depreciation).13 
The empirical literature has established some link between sudden stops in capital flows and the 
adverse environment described above – albeit with more nuanced results. For example, Edwards (2005) 
and Freund and Warnock (2007) show that sudden stops are correlated with currency depreciations, 
slower growth, and higher interest rates. Catão and Milesi-Ferretti (2011) find that current account 
deficits increase the probability of debt crises (defined as requiring large disbursements from 
multilateral programs or external default), while Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) find that current 
account deficits precede systemic banking crises in advanced economies. Frankel and Saravelos (2010) 
review 80 papers estimating various forms of “early-warning models” that attempt to predict country 
vulnerability to various types of crises and provides a useful synthesis to this large literature. They find 
current account deficits are significant in predicting currency crises and vulnerabilities to current 
account reversals, but not as powerful as other variables (such as exchange rate appreciation and 
reserve accumulation).  
The broader literature also finds that the type of financial flows corresponding to current account 
deficits can affect a country’s vulnerability and the risk of a sudden stop. For example, there is evidence 
that countries have a lower probability of experiencing a sudden stop if a larger share of the current 
account is financed by capital flows that are more stable (such as FDI), that foster greater automatic risk 
                                                          
12 According to the IMF’s Balance of Payments manual, the capital account is “credit and debit entries for non-produced 
nonfinancial assets and capital transfers between residents and non-residents. It records acquisitions and disposals of non-
produced nonfinancial assets, such as land sold to embassies and sales of leases and licenses, as well as capital transfers, that is, 
the provision of resources for capital purposes by one party without anything of economic value being supplied as a direct 
return to that party.”  
13 See Mendoza (2010). 
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sharing (such as equity), or that correspond to investors with a longer time horizon.14 Perhaps most 
important, this literature has also shifted away from focusing on net financial flows (which net out gross 
inflows from foreigners less outflows from domestics) that correspond to the current account deficit. 
Instead, the literature is increasingly focusing on gross capital flows as a measure of a country’s 
vulnerability.15 The 1956 Suez Crisis, discussed above, when the UK had a small current account surplus 
but was still vulnerable to a sudden stop in financing from abroad, was an early example of this point.  
The second strand of literature on the vulnerabilities related to current account deficits focuses on the 
fact that these deficits lead to a deterioration in the net international investment position (holding 
everything else constant). This deterioration can make investors question a country’s ability to repay its 
external obligations, i.e. its solvency. To illustrate the link between the current account and the net 
international investment position, decompose the net international investment position (NIIP) of 
country i at time t into its holdings of foreign assets (A) net of foreign liabilities (L), for all asset/liability 
categories (c), such as FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, bank lending, and “other”, with all variables 
expressed in domestic currency: 
  𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ �𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝑐 − 𝐿𝑖,𝑡𝑐 �𝑐  .       (2) 
Then further decompose any change in the NIIP into: changes in international capital flows (captured in 
the current account as shown in equation 1); changes in the valuation of existing investment positions 
(∆𝑉𝐴𝐿); and other adjustments to the value of international assets or liabilities that are not otherwise 
included (OAdj), such as data revisions or adjustments related to the relocation of headquarters:16 
∆𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖,𝑡 .      (3)  
The academic literature has found mixed evidence on this link between current account deficits and a 
country’s vulnerability operating through deteriorating NIIP positions. For example, Blanchard et al. 
(2010) show that large external debt positions were a significant predictor of output losses during the 
global financial crisis, and Catao and Milesi-Ferretti (2014) show that the stock of net external debt is a 
robust predictor of external crises, even after controlling for current account balances. Frankel and 
Saravelos’ (2010) previously mentioned review of 80 studies, however, shows that only a small 
proportion of these studies finds a significant relationship between a country’s net external debt 
position and the probability of having a crisis. Their own analysis finds that external debt positions 
significantly predict equity market falls and recessions, but not currency depreciations, the need to 
borrow from the IMF, or other “crisis” measures.  
These mixed results undoubtedly reflect the challenges in determining a country’s solvency, which 
would require incorporating factors in addition to the NIIP position (such as expected growth, the 
composition and liquidity of the international assets and liabilities,17 the currency denomination of the 
borrowing, the country’s ability to print its own currency, the country’s willingness to repay, etc.) 
                                                          
14 For evidence, see Forbes (2013) and Forbes and Warnock (2014).  
15 Forbes and Warnock (2012) first develops this approach of focusing on gross capital inflows and outflows by foreigners and 
domestics, rather than net capital flows, to analyse country vulnerability to sudden stops. Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2010) and 
and Avdjiev, McCauley and Shin (2015) also highlight the importance of looking at gross flows.  
16 The decomposition used here is similar to that in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007a) and Devereux and Sutherland (2010). 
Note that other adjustments also include the effect of real GDP growth on the past NIIP (the “denominator effect”). See Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) and Lane (2015) for information on this OAdj term. 
17 See Gourinchas (2011) for the role of liquidity in assessing global imbalances. 
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Although large external liabilities undoubtedly increase a country’s vulnerability and cannot grow 
infinitely, assessing exactly when net external borrowing becomes a significant concern is a challenge. 
The third and final focus in analyses of the concerns related to current account deficits bypasses any 
relationships with crises. Instead, this literature focuses on whether current account deficits reflect 
underlying macroeconomic imbalances that will require a “reversal” in the current account, which in 
turn entails slower growth and other costly macroeconomic adjustment (such as reduced consumption 
and real wages).18 This literature builds on the traditional approach to modelling current account 
imbalances; countries must satisfy inter-temporal budget constraints, so any country that accumulates 
current account deficits will have to run a surplus in the future. An unsustainable current account could 
be generated by macroeconomic imbalances resulting from unexpectedly low productivity growth, 
excessive consumption or investment, inflated asset prices, or an unsustainable fiscal deficit. When the 
current account deficit reverses, it requires a change in production and consumption profiles – usually a 
fall in domestic demand, a currency depreciation, and potentially other difficult adjustments ensuring 
that the trade balance improves.19 
The academic evidence on the characteristics of these types of reversals is not uniform, but suggests 
that they can be costly. For example, Freund and Warnock (2007) look at 26 episodes from 1980-2003 in 
industrial countries and find that income growth slows when current account deficits reverse and that 
larger current account deficits take longer to resolve. In one of the most careful recent analyses, Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) find that current account reversals generally do not correspond to increased 
exports (which would support overall growth), but instead to “demand compression” – i.e. reduced 
imports and domestic demand. Analysis also suggests that structural reforms contributing to reversals 
by increasing domestic competitiveness over time may have a negative short-run impact on growth (e.g. 
Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Raffo, 2014). An earlier vein of this literature also attempted to find a 
“threshold” for current account deficits that corresponded to an impending difficult adjustment; some 
papers found evidence that 5% was a level at which a painful current account reversal was significantly 
more likely. But there is a huge variance around estimates of this threshold and there is now general 
agreement there is no “magic number”.20  
Most recently, several papers have highlighted an important link between these literatures focusing on 
different vulnerabilities related to current account deficits: rapid domestic credit growth (e.g. 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012, Schularick and Taylor, 2012, and Korinek, 2011).21 These papers argue 
that it is the rapid increase in domestic credit (which often corresponds to large current account deficits, 
capital inflows from abroad, and a deterioration in the NIIP) that has the greatest explanatory power in 
predicting crises. If a current account deficit is not accompanied by this macroeconomic imbalance of 
                                                          
18 See Adalet and Eichengreen (2007) for an analysis of current account reversals since the 1880s. 
19 Because the main component of the current account in these models is the trade balance, this “reversal” of a current account 
deficit into a surplus generally corresponds to a reversal of the trade deficit to a surplus. 
20 For example, Freund (2005) found that after current account deficits reach 5% of GDP, they are generally followed by a 
period of slowing income growth, currency depreciation, and declining investment. Summers (2004) also refers to this 5% 
threshold. In contrast, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) examine a larger sample of countries and do not find evidence that 
current account deficits above this level are systematically associated with slower growth and currency crises. 
21 Korinek (2011) models how these various factors could be related. In an economy with incomplete financial markets, a 
sudden stop of foreign financing generates a depreciation, which raises the value of foreign liabilities and tightens financial 
constraints. Individuals do not internalize this effect of a sudden stop, causing them to borrow too much and generating the 
unsustainable credit boom and current account deficit. 
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rapidly increasing credit growth, these papers find that countries with large current account deficits are 
not significantly more likely to experience a crisis or current account reversal. It is thus the end to 
unsustainable credit growth associated with borrowing from abroad that leads to sudden stops and 
painful reversals in the current account. 
C. Vulnerabilities Related to Current Account Deficits: Missing Pieces 
This recent focus on credit growth as a key link between current account deficits, capital inflows, 
macroeconomic imbalances, financial crises, external liabilities, and difficult reversals highlights an 
important shift in the literature on current account vulnerabilities – away from the simplistic view of the 
current account as equivalent to the trade balance and instead focusing on its financial component. This 
does not mean that trade is unimportant in the vulnerabilities and adjustments related to large current 
account deficits. Instead, this shift highlights the growing importance of financial channels due to 
increased cross-border financial exposures, as well as the much more rapid adjustments that can occur 
through financial channels than through trade.  
Simple balance of payments accounting reminds us that the current account is a function of the trade 
balance (TB) and a financial component. This financial component can be decomposed into net primary 
investment income (INVINC) and other primary and secondary income (OINC):22  
𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 .      (4) 
Moreover, combining equations (3) and (4) yields: 
∆𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 ,     (5)  
where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 denotes other primary and secondary income and other adjustments to the NIIP (which are 
generally small). This shows that analysis of the vulnerabilities related to a country’s international 
investment position should consider valuation effects on international investment positions, as well as 
international investment income flows.  
Figure 3 highlights why paying greater attention to the financial flows and financial positions linked to 
the current account has become more important: increased financial globalization since the early 1990s.  
The figure shows the sharp increase in cross-border financial assets and liabilities that occurred from 
about 1990 through 2007, broken out by the type of exposure. Cross-border financial exposures have 
roughly stabilized since then, largely reflecting a reduction in international bank flows.23 Even if cross-
border financial flows do not return to their pre-crisis levels, however, the past accumulation of 
international assets and liabilities implies that international financial exposures are likely to remain 
substantially elevated relative to past decades.  This increase in cross-border financial exposures has 
important implications for vulnerabilities related to the current account deficit as it affects both net 
international investment positions and international investment income.   
                                                          
22 The trade balance includes trade in goods and services; net primary investment income is the return from past investment in 
financial assets and production processes (largely dividends and interest); other net primary income consists predominantly of 
compensation of employees; net secondary income is basically personal transfers, international assistance, charities and some 
inter-government payments (which is a small component of the current account for the countries considered here). 
23 For more information on this “deglobalisation” in capital flows, and especially banking, see Cerutti and Claessens (2014), 
Forbes (2014b), and Forbes, Reinhardt and Wieladek (2016). 
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Several important papers have considered the implications of these increased cross-border financial 
exposures for net international investment positions, focusing on the effects of valuation changes.24 
There has not, however, been comparable work assessing the related implications for international 
investment income – i.e. the financial component of the current account. Moreover, little attention has 
been paid to how both valuation changes and international investment income could interact with risks 
related to the current account.  
Therefore, in the analysis that follows, we will focus on the role of financial factors for the current 
account and international investment position. Financial factors such as investment income and 
valuation changes can be large, important, and fast moving – and therefore critical to assessing a 
country’s vulnerability.  
 
II. Incorporating International Financial Exposures and Investment Income into Vulnerability 
Analysis 
This section investigates the role of investment income and valuation changes to understand the 
dynamics and vulnerabilities of current accounts and international investment positions. It begins with 
empirical evidence on their importance. Then it develops a basic theoretical framework to show what 
drivers determine the evolution of these financial factors. The section ends by providing evidence of the 
magnitudes and relative importance of these drivers in different countries.  
A. The Importance of Financial Factors for the Current Account and NIIP  
How important are financial factors (valuation changes and investment income) relative to trade (which 
traditionally receives more attention) in understanding the vulnerabilities related to current accounts?  
Figure 4 provides an initial indication that these financial channels can be very important. It uses the 
decomposition in equation (5) to report the ratios of the variances of the trade balance, investment 
income, and valuation effects to the overall variance in the NIIP for a large sample of around 180 
countries and then for the UK.25  Figure 4a reports results for a long period from 1980 to 2014, and 
Figure 4b for the more recent and more “financially globalized” period from 2004 to 2014.  Valuation 
effects play a significant role – and appear to be even more important than trade.  More specifically, the 
variance of valuation effects amounted to 35% of the variance of overall NIIP changes for the full sample 
over the longer period, relative to 25% for trade and 8% for primary income (the largest component of 
which is net investment income).  The role of valuation effects is even greater in the UK on an absolute 
basis and relative to trade – where they explain 45% of the variance compared to only 10% for trade. 
Even more striking is how these valuation effects have increased over time.  Over the last 10 years (in 
Figure 4b), the role of valuation effects in explaining the variance in the NIIP is substantially greater – 
reaching 61% for the full sample and 144% in the UK.26  This increased role is not surprising given larger 
international financial exposures, as discussed in the previous section, which magnify the impact of a 
                                                          
24 Key papers are: Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), Gourinchas, Rey and Treumpler (2012), Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2012), Obstfeld (2012), and Benetrix et al. (2015). 
25 The shares do not add to 100% due mainly to covariances between the NIIP components, as well as to other smaller 
components and data issues that are not reported to simplify the comparisons.  In Figures 4-8, we use net primary income as a 
proxy for net primary investment income due to data availability issues.   
26 The key results do not change significantly if we vary the start and end dates or exclude the recent crisis. 
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given change in the rate of capital gains on these positions.  Concerns about country vulnerability linked 
to unsustainable NIIPs should clearly include analysis of these valuation changes.  
Any assessment of current account vulnerabilities should also consider financial effects through the 
investment income component of the current account.  This link has been largely ignored in the 
literature (unlike for valuation effects) – possibly due to the common shortcut of treating the current 
account balance as equivalent to the trade balance.  Figure 5 shows, however, that this shortcut is not 
valid.  It graphs current accounts for the 15 OECD countries with the largest current account deficits over 
2013-2014 and breaks these deficits into the three components shown in equation (4): the trade 
balance, investment income (proxied by primary income) and other income (proxied by secondary 
income).  Large current account deficits are clearly not synonymous with large trade deficits; investment 
income balances can also be significant determinants of current account balances.  In fact, the 
investment income balance (proxied by the primary income balance) constitutes a larger share of the 
current account deficit than trade in a number of countries, including South Africa, Colombia, Peru, 
Brazil, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Chile and Mexico.   
Even if international investment income is important in explaining the levels of some countries’ current 
account deficits, is it also important in explaining changes in current accounts?  This may be even more 
important for any analysis of vulnerabilities related to sudden stops and reversals in current accounts.  
Figure 6 shows the share of the variance in the current account that is explained by the variance of 
trade, investment income (proxied by primary income) and secondary income for a large sample of 
countries and the UK.  Figure 6a is again for the full period from 1980-2014, while Figure 6b just focuses 
on the last 10 years.  The figures show that trade accounts for more of the variance in the current 
account than investment income for the full sample of countries in each of the windows.  The estimates 
for the UK, however, indicate that this can vary substantially over time and across individual countries.  
In the UK, trade explained 87% of the variance in the current account over the full period – about twice 
as much as explained by investment income.  In contrast, over the last ten years the relative importance 
of these components has basically reversed, with investment income recently explaining twice as much 
of the variance in the current account as trade.  
This increased role of investment income in explaining movements in the UK’s current account balance 
recently is even more striking when its evolution is viewed over time. Figure 7a graphs the 10-year 
rolling correlation of the UK’s current account balance with the trade and primary income balances 
using data since 1980.  In the 1980’s and 1990’s, movements in the UK current account almost perfectly 
corresponded to movements in the UK trade balance.  This correlation fell throughout the 2000’s and 
during the crisis, and is now negative.  In contrast, the correlation between the UK’s current account 
deficit and primary income balance has increased sharply since the early 2000’s and is now close to 
one.27 This transition is striking and suggests that movements in the UK current account balance have 
recently been driven almost entirely by changes in investment income, with little impact of changes in 
trade.  Treating the current account balance as a trade balance is clearly no longer appropriate.  
Moreover, a similar analysis for other countries shows that the UK is not unique; there is a range of 
country experiences. For example, Figures 7b through 7j perform the same analysis for 9 other OECD 
economies with flexible exchange rates: the US, Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, 
                                                          
27 The pattern of a lower correlation of the current account with the trade balance and higher correlation with the income 
balance is unchanged if we use a shorter rolling window of 5 years to exclude the financial crisis from the latest data point. 
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Sweden, and Switzerland. The US figure also shows a correlation of nearly 100% between movements in 
investment income and current account balance today (although with different trade correlations). In 
contrast, Canada, Japan and Norway have negative – instead of positive – correlations between 
movements in their current account balances and investment income. These negative correlations are a 
sharp reversal from large positive correlations around 2004-2005 in these three countries.  
This discussion has shown that any analysis of vulnerabilities related to current account deficits should 
no longer just treat the current account deficit as a trade deficit, but also incorporate an analysis of the 
investment income component of the current account.  Similarly, any analysis of vulnerabilities related 
to the corresponding NIIP should no longer treat this as an accumulation of current account balances, 
but also incorporate an analysis of valuation effects on the NIIP.  Incorporating analysis of these financial 
factors alongside trade could improve our understanding of the dynamics and risks related to current 
account deficits, as summarized in the literature review in Section I.  For example, does the evidence 
suggesting that larger current account deficits increase the probability of having a “sudden stop” in 
capital flows hold regardless of whether the current account deficit is caused by a deficit in investment 
income or in trade?  Or if a large current account deficit does not reflect any macroeconomic 
imbalances, but instead is driven by changes in investment income due to external shocks, is the current 
account less likely to “reverse” and cause a difficult economic adjustment?  And should we be less 
concerned about any solvency risks from a large negative NIIP position if it is stabilized due to positive 
investment income flows or valuation effects?  
While addressing all of these implications is beyond the scope of this paper, one additional example 
highlights how a broader framework that incorporates financial channels is useful to address these types 
of questions. Figure 8 shows the evolution of the NIIP for the same sample of 10 OECD economies with 
flexible exchange rates. The dotted blue lines graph cumulated trade balances (relative to GDP) since 
1980 – and show the changes in the NIIPs that would have occurred if trade balances (instead of current 
account balances) corresponded to the financial accounts and there had been no valuation changes on 
the NIIP.  The green lines show the cumulated investment income balances, and the red lines the 
cumulated valuation changes on the NIIPs.  For some countries, such as the UK and US, the cumulated 
investment income balance and valuation changes are positive, generating substantial improvements in 
the actual NIIP positions (the black lines) relative to the cumulated trade deficits.  These financial effects 
through international investment income and valuation effects have improved the UK and US NIIPs by 
about 10% and 20% of GDP, respectively.  These are meaningful improvements and show how these 
financial factors have the potential to influence assessments of country solvency. 
But it is also important to note that these effects could work in the opposite direction and weaken a 
country’s NIIP relative to what it would have been without these financial effects.  For example, the 
same analysis shows that Sweden would currently have a positive NIIP if this only captured cumulated 
trade surpluses.  Instead, large negative valuation adjustments and primary income deficits over much 
of this period have generated a small negative NIIP over this window.  Korea is another country for 
which the NIIP is substantially lower than its cumulated trade balances (by over 20% of GDP), due to 
consistent large negative valuation effects and moderate negative investment income flows.  
To summarize, when assessing a country’s vulnerabilities related to current account deficits, it is no 
longer sufficient to simply assume that the deficits are mainly driven by changes in the trade balance 
and will translate directly into changes in the NIIP.  Instead, it is necessary to take a closer look at the 
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financial component of the current account (investment income) and the role of valuation changes for 
international assets and liabilities.  These financial components may generate a meaningful 
deterioration – or improvement – in current account balances and NIIPs.  But what determines the 
evolution and impact of these financial components? 
B. A Framework for Understanding the Financial Determinants of the Current Account and NIIP 
In order to better understand the determinants of valuation changes and investment income, we can 
use a simple decomposition. To begin, use the definitions and terminology from equations (1) through 
(5) above to decompose the changes in valuations: 
∆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ �𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1𝑐 �𝑘𝑔𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1𝐴,𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 − �𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐−𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1𝐴,𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 �� −  𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1𝑐 �𝑘𝑔𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1𝐿,𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐 − �𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐−𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1𝐿,𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐 �� �𝑐   =  ∑ � 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1𝑐
∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 �𝑘𝑔𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 − �∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 − 1���𝑐 − ∑ � 𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1𝑐∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐 �𝑘𝑔𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐 − �∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐 − 1���𝑐  ,  (6) 
where 𝑘𝑔𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 (𝑘𝑔𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐) denotes the rate of capital gain on external assets (liabilities),  𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 (𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐)  is the 
exchange rate index which reflects the currency composition of country i’s asset (liability) holdings of 
class c ,and ∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 ≡ 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1𝐴,𝑐   and ∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐 ≡ 𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1𝐿,𝑐 . The exchange rate is defined as the cost of one unit 
of domestic currency in units of foreign currency so that the exchange rate falls (increases) when the 
currency depreciates (appreciates). Equation (6) shows that capital gains resulting from changes in asset 
prices and exchange rate changes affect valuations. 
Next, perform a similar decomposition of international investment income into changes in exchange 
rates and the returns received on assets from abroad (and the returns paid on liabilities owed to 
foreigners): 
 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ �𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1𝑐 �𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1𝐴,𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 � − 𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1𝑐 �𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1𝐿,𝑐𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐 ��𝑐 ,    (7) 
with 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 denoting country i’s nominal rate of return on A (foreign assets) or L (foreign liabilities) in 
terms of last period’s stock, excluding exchange rate effects.  
Finally, insert the decomposition in equation (6) for valuation changes and in equation (7) for 
investment income into the definition of changes in the NIIP position in equation (5) to get: 
∆𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡+𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + ∑ � 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1𝑐
∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 �𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 + 𝑘𝑔𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 − �∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 − 1���𝑐 − ∑ � 𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1𝑐∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐 �𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐 + 𝑘𝑔𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐 − �∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐 − 1���𝑐 , (8) 
where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑂𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖,𝑡. That is, changes in the NIIP can be decomposed into the trade balance, 
other small effects (which we will largely ignore), and a term capturing the relevant financial variables 
related to international financial exposures. 
More specifically, this series of equations shows that a country’s international investment income and 
its valuation changes (and corresponding changes in its international investment position) depend on 
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four sets of variables: last period’s stock of international assets and liabilities, the nominal rate of return 
and capital gains on these international assets and liabilities28, the composition of assets and liabilities in 
terms of class (c), and exchange rates (which reflect the currency composition of the country’s assets 
and liabilities).  Before estimating the importance of each of these variables for different countries over 
time, it is worth briefly reviewing the role of each of these four sets of variables. 
First, the gross stocks of international assets and liabilities – i.e. existing international exposures – play 
an important role in determining investment income and changes in the NIIP. The larger the stock of 
assets, the higher is any investment income and the larger is the impact of any change in the rates of 
capital gains, the rates of return, or exchange rates. Equation (8) shows that even if a country’s net 
financial position is zero, changes in the other variables, combined with large gross positions, can 
generate changes in the NIIP. For example, if the rate of capital gains on assets is higher than the rate of 
capital gains on liabilities, or if the exchange rate associated with assets depreciates more than that 
associated with liabilities, then the inherited asset position (in domestic currency) increases, even if the 
initial net position (NIIP) is zero. Gross positions matter! 
Second, the difference between the nominal rates of return on assets and liabilities, ∑ ��𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐� − �𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐��𝑐 , 
often denoted excess return, is important. The higher are returns on assets relative to liabilities, the 
higher is investment income. Similarly, differences in capital gains across assets and liabilities, 
∑ ��𝑘𝑔𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐� − �𝑘𝑔𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐��𝑐 , can have important valuation effects. The higher are capital gains on assets 
relative to liabilities, the greater the improvement in the NIIP.  
Third, the composition of assets and liabilities between categories such as equity and debt (or more 
detailed breakdowns) matters for all components of these equations. For example, consider equation 
(7) for investment income – the simplest of these decompositions. It shows that even if returns and 
exchange rates are identical within each asset class, and the overall assets and liabilities net out to zero, 
a different asset composition across assets and liabilities could make investment income positive or 
negative. More specifically, still assuming identical returns and exchange rates within each asset class 
and an NIIP of zero, if a greater share of assets was held in equities than for liabilities, and equities 
earned a higher return than other investment categories, investment income would be positive.   
Finally, each of the decompositions shows that exchange rates play a particularly important role for 
valuation effects and investment income, both through their direct impact on the value of net foreign 
assets (which affects valuation gains and investment income), but also because any movements in the 
exchange rate might mitigate or accentuate the impact of contemporaneous changes in rates of return 
on investment income and of rates of capital gains on the NIIP.  Accurately measuring the various 
exchange rates for different asset and liability classes if the currency denomination differs is also 
critically important to capture the corresponding effects. Complicating this analysis, the standard 
calculation for an exchange rate – say based on trade-weighted exposures – can differ from the 
appropriate exchange rate for assets or liabilities based on a country’s financial exposures. For example, 
Figure 9 shows the standard trade-weighted exchange rate for the UK, as well as the financial-weighted 
exchange rate indices for UK international assets and liabilities, constructed from data compiled by 
Benetrix et al. (2015) using the methods set out in Lane and Shambaugh (2010). Although the various 
exchange rate measures move closely over some periods, they can also diverge at times.  This can have 
                                                          
28 The rates of return and capital gains both exclude exchange rate effects. 
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a significant effect on international investment income and valuation effects – even if a country has a 
net zero international investment position and otherwise equal capital gains or returns on assets and 
liabilities. This is not obviously intuitive, so a concrete example may help. 
Consider the broad-based depreciation of sterling, shown in Figure 9, which followed the financial crisis 
between 2007 and 2009.  Had the UK’s proportion of assets and liabilities denominated in foreign 
currency been identical, the exchange rate indices on assets and liabilities would have moved 
symmetrically.  Because more assets than liabilities were denominated in foreign currency, however, the 
exchange rate on assets depreciated by 7% more than the exchange rate on liabilities over this period – 
increasing the sterling value of those assets (and reducing the negative impact of the fall in capital 
gains). That is, through its impact on the valuation of assets, the depreciation increased the UK’s foreign 
assets.  In contrast, the depreciation had the opposite impact on the liabilities side: it increased the 
value of liabilities denominated in foreign currencies (and mitigated the fall in capital gains on liabilities).  
Since more of the UK’s foreign assets than liabilities are denominated in foreign currencies, the 
exchange rate on assets depreciated more than the exchange rate on liabilities. Even assuming similar 
capital gains and initial positions across assets and liabilities – this broad-based exchange rate 
depreciation would have had the effect of increasing the return on assets more than the return on 
liabilities, thereby on net improving the NIIP through valuation effects.29 Conversely, from 2013 to 2015, 
the exchange rate on foreign assets appreciated by more than that on foreign liabilities, contributing to 
the deterioration in the NIIP and international investment income over this period. 
To summarize, this section has developed a theoretical framework to show how the determinants of a 
country’s vulnerabilities related to the current account can be described using a limited set of variables. 
Financial variables play a key role – whether through exchange rate movements, international asset and 
liability positions, returns and capital gains on these positions, or the composition of these positions. But 
how important is each of these variables in practice?  
C. Empirical Decompositions:  The Drivers of Valuation Changes and Investment Income  
The decomposition in the last section shows that four sets of financial variables are important to 
understand vulnerabilities related to current account deficits: last period’s stock of international assets 
and liabilities, the nominal rate of return and capital gains on these international positions, the 
composition of these positions, and exchange rates. The relative importance of each of these four 
determinants varies by country and time period, depending on the country’s international portfolio, on 
changes in rates of return and capital gains, and on changes in exchange rates. Applying this framework 
to available data to estimate the contribution of each of these variables, as shown in equations (6) 
through (8), however, is not straightforward. Previous academic literature suggests two different 
approaches. One strand of literature has focused on decomposing different countries’ net foreign 
returns into a return effect and a composition effect, (i.e. focusing on the �𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐� − �𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐� for each 
asset/liability and composition c in equation 7).30 The second strand of literature has focused on the role 
of exchange rate adjustments, and especially how they can determine valuation changes based on the 
currency composition of assets and liabilities.31 We unify these different approaches and build more 
                                                          
29 This has also been shown in Gourinchas, Rey and Treumpler (2012). 
30 For examples of this approach, see Gourinchas and Rey (2007b) and Curcuru et al. (2013).  
31 For examples of this approach, see Lane and Shambaugh (2010) and Benetrix, Lane and Shambaugh (2015). 
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closely on the decompositions developed in equations (6) through (8) in order to provide a framework 
to measure all of the different financial effects simultaneously. This requires some additional 
calculations and assumptions, which are described in detail in Appendix A. The covariances between 
these four variables will also matter—as will be clarified in more detail in Section III.  
Figure 10 reports the results of these decompositions into the four main financial determinants (last 
period’s stock of international assets and liabilities, the excess nominal rate of return and capital gains, 
the composition of the portfolio, and exchange rates) using data from 1990 to 2014 for the sample of 10 
OECD economies with flexible exchange rates used previously.32 For each country in the sample, the 
panel on the left reports the decomposition for investment income, while the right panel reports the 
decomposition for valuation changes. Not surprisingly, the relative importance of each of these four 
channels varies by country and time period, depending on the country’s portfolio of international assets 
and liabilities and changes in exchange rates and rates of return and capital gains. The figures highlight 
the range of experiences.  
For example, beginning with the decompositions for investment income, some countries have had large, 
positive income flows for much of the sample – such as the US and Japan (for the full period), 
Switzerland (except in 2008), the UK (from 2000 to 2012), and Norway and Sweden (since the early 
2000s). In the US, this positive investment income largely reflects a consistent and large positive return 
effect (partially counteracted by consistent negative contributions from its stock of net liabilities). In 
contrast, the positive investment income in Switzerland and Japan reflects large positive stock effects 
(with both countries holding large net asset positions), combined with positive composition effects for 
Switzerland and return effects for Japan. In the UK, its strong investment income in the 2000s resulted 
primarily from the composition of its international investments (with a greater exposure to equity than 
debt) and a moderate boost from relative returns. Recently UK investment income deteriorated sharply, 
largely due to negative return effects (reflecting weaker relative economic performance abroad), 
combined with smaller gains from composition effects (due to an increasing share of UK liabilities in 
debt). Norway’s transition to earning positive net investment income in the early 2000’s largely resulted 
from a stock effect, while Sweden’s transition largely reflected a positive return effect. Large negative 
flows for international investment income, such as in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada (until the 
early-2000s), are often driven by large stock effects – showing the challenges for countries with large 
net international liabilities. 
The panels on the right, which decompose valuation changes, show that not only does the role of the 
four different determinants fluctuate more from year to year than occurred for investment income, but 
even the direction of the net changes is much less stable. The stock effects, however, generally tend to 
be smaller. Trends in the UK and US highlight how the different channels can play different roles at 
different times. During the 2008 crisis, the UK experienced large positive valuation effects on its 
international investments, driven largely by the exchange rate channel (and sterling’s depreciation), 
albeit partially counteracted by a negative composition effect (as more of its international assets were in 
equities, which lost more value than debt). In 2014 the UK experienced a negative valuation effect, 
which was largely driven by an exchange rate effect (and sterling’s appreciation). In contrast, in 2008 the 
US experienced negative valuation effects, driven by a powerful composition effect.  In 2014 the US also 
experienced large negative valuation effects, except in this case driven primarily by the return channel 
                                                          
32 For some countries the sample starts later due to data availability. 
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(at least partially reflecting higher yields on bonds and equities in the US relative to the returns US 
investors earned abroad in the same investment categories).  
Given the range of different experiences, both across time and across countries, it is useful to try to 
quantify the relative importance of these four channels determining investment income and valuation 
effects over time. Table 1 provides one quantification – the correlation of international investment 
income and valuation changes with each of the four components for each country over the sample 
period. The averages for the sample highlight a number of points: a) the return effect is the most highly 
correlated with both investment income and valuation changes, indicating it plays an important role; b) 
the initial stock effect is also highly correlated with investment income, albeit somewhat less so with 
valuation changes; and c) many of the correlations vary substantially across countries. These differences 
are particularly noteworthy for exchange rate effects, whose correlations with investment income range 
from -0.34 in Sweden to about 0.34 for Switzerland. Similarly, although several countries have a large 
positive correlation between their exchange rate effects and valuation changes, others have negative 
effects (such as the US, Australia, and Switzerland) – with some of these differences reflecting whether 
the country’s currency is treated as a safe haven.  
One important consideration that is not captured in these averages, however, is how these different 
channels function during “good” times, such as from 2000 to 2007, relative to how these channels 
operate during periods of crisis or economic stress. For example, the graphs show that in 2008, the peak 
of the global financial crisis, some countries had large positive valuation effects (such as the UK and 
South Korea), while others had large negative valuation effects (such as the US, Japan and Norway). 
Switzerland also experienced a large negative investment income flow – a sharp turnaround from other 
years in the sample and largely caused by a negative return effect. It is precisely during such periods of 
crisis and heightened economic stress that concerns about vulnerabilities related to current accounts 
increase. Therefore, the final section of this paper will extend this analysis one step further. It will build 
on this framework to better understand how these financial components respond to various shocks – 
and especially the types of shocks that correspond to increased concerns about current account deficits. 
 
III. Current Account Vulnerability during Heightened Domestic and Global Risk  
The previous section showed that movements in investment income and the valuations of international 
investment positions (and thus in the current account and the NIIP) will be determined by structural and 
cyclical factors influencing the quantity and composition of international assets and liabilities, their 
returns (including capital gains) and changes in exchange rates. To see how this framework for analyzing 
vulnerabilities related to the current account works in practice, we extend the analysis to evaluate what 
it implies during a period of heightened risk and uncertainty.33 Research over the last few years has 
highlighted the strong relationship between changes in risk (as often measured by the VIX) and sudden 
shifts in capital flows and the broader global financial cycle in credit growth and leverage.34 It is during 
these periods of heightened risk that current account deficits usually become harder to finance, 
requiring sharp movements in asset prices and difficult economic adjustments.  
                                                          
33 We will use the words “risk” and “uncertainty” interchangeably in the following discussion, although in many frameworks 
they capture two distinct concepts – changes in risk aversion and economic uncertainty. 
34 For evidence on the relationship of risk: with capital flows, see Forbes and Warnock (2012, 2014); with bank lending, see 
Bruno and Shin (2015); and with the global financial cycle, see Rey (2013) and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015). 
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We model these periods of heightened risk as associated with increases in an “X-factor” (or risk factor). 
Changes in that risk factor could be caused by many types of events and can incorporate a global (XG) 
and/or a domestic (XD) component. The global component corresponds to any increased uncertainty 
about the evolution of the global economy, periods of reduced global market liquidity, any widespread 
financial crisis, or anything that makes global investors, consumers and businesses more risk averse. The 
domestic factor is local to one specific economy and does not affect global financial markets. It 
corresponds to events such as increased uncertainty about the domestic economy, or anything that 
makes domestic consumers, businesses and investors more “risk averse”, including political uncertainty. 
How do the characteristics of a country’s international investment position determine the extent to 
which a shock to global or domestic risk impacts that country’s current account and NIIP? What are the 
characteristics which aggravate vulnerabilities? And what are those that mitigate them through 
international risk sharing?35  
This section answers these questions, but to simplify the analysis, we focus on financial effects and 
ignore any effects through the trade balance.  This is not to say that any adjustments through trade are 
unimportant, but trade relationships have been well studied elsewhere and are generally much slower 
than the financial channels on which this paper focuses. This section begins by showing the channels 
through which domestic and global risk, respectively, can affect the current account and NIIP. These 
channels correspond to the four sets of variables specified in equation (8) and discussed in Section II.  
The analysis then shows which country characteristics affect the relative importance of each of these 
channels and performs a comparison across the sample of 10 OECD countries used previously. The 
section closes with a more detailed analysis of the effects of risk shocks on investment income and 
positions using an SVAR model that we estimate using data on the UK. This allows us to assess not only 
the direction, but also the magnitude, of the effect of heightened global and domestic risk on UK 
vulnerabilities related to the current account.  
A. How Risk Affects the Components of the Current Account and the NIIP 
To begin, we build on the accounting framework developed in Section II to describe the channels 
through which changes in risk may affect the current account and the NIIP. Using equation (8) to 
calculate the impact of a change in risk on the various components of the NIIP yields: 
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Then, in order to further break down how the current account is affected by increased risk, use the 
definition for the current account in equation (4) and the decomposition of investment income in 
equation (7) to obtain:  
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35 See Gourinchas, Rey and Truempler (2012) for calculations of the amount of risk sharing through net international 
investment positions during the 2008 crisis. They estimate large effects. For example, they calculate that the US transferred 
$2,200 billion in wealth transfers abroad from 2007q4 to 2009q1, while the UK had a net gain of $542 billion between 2007q4 
and 2008q4. While our approach has similarities with theirs, we consider more channels through which external positions can 
affect risk sharing, and we consider these channels over a longer period of time. 
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Finally, combining the effects of heightened risk on the valuation channel (on the right side of equation 
9) and the investment income channel (on the right side of equation 10), yields the overall impact of risk 
on the NIIP: 
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where 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑂𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑂𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖,𝑡 reflects adjustments which are usually relatively small, and that we 
therefore abstract from. 
Equations (10) and (11) show that, assuming a given trade balance, the impact of a risk shock on the 
current account (through investment income) and on the NIIP (through both investment income and 
valuation changes) will be determined by: the initial stock of international assets and liabilities, the rates 
of returns and capital gains on these positions, the composition of these positions, and the response of 
the exchange rates on assets and liabilities (which is determined by the currency denomination of these 
positions and the relevant bilateral exchange rate movements). To more closely analyze these various 
channels, we begin with the simpler case of increased domestic risk, and then move to the effects of 
global risk.  
B. The Impact of Domestic Risk  
The various effects of a shock to domestic risk, as shown in equations (10) and (11), can be simplified 
given our definition that this type of shock does not affect the returns and capital gains on foreign assets 
and only directly affects the domestic economy (through the returns and capital gains on domestic 
liabilities and the exchange rate).36 Therefore focusing on the effect of the shock on liabilities, the key 
country characteristics and channels that determine how increased domestic risk affects a country’s 
current account and the NIIP, are: 
i. The initial stock of liabilities: a greater stock of liabilities will increase the impact of the shock on 
total capital gains and returns (leading to a greater reduction in payments abroad and greater 
reduction in the value of international liabilities, improving the current account and NIIP), as 
well as the overall impact from any change in exchange rates. 
ii. The composition of the initial stock of liabilities: the more risky are the liabilities, the greater the 
impact on the rate of return and capital gains on these liabilities (reducing payments abroad, 
increasing net investment income, and improving the current account and NIIP). 
iii. The currency of denomination of assets: the more assets are denominated in foreign currency, 
the more will the associated exchange rate depreciate (increasing receipts from abroad, 
increasing net investment income, and improving the current account and NIIP).  
iv. The currency of denomination of liabilities: the more liabilities are denominated in foreign 
currency, the more will the associated exchange rate depreciate (increasing payments abroad, 
lowering net investment income, and deteriorating the current account and NIIP). 
                                                          
36 While the shock does not have any direct impact on international assets, some characteristics related to assets, such as the 
effects of exchange rate movements, play a role in risk sharing following a domestic shock.  
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v. The co-movement of rates of returns on liabilities with exchange rates: the more does the 
exchange rate associated with liabilities depreciate as their rate of return falls, the less benefit 
will occur from lower returns on liabilities (the more will the negative effects from iv. counter 
the positive effects from i. and ii. on investment income, the current account and NIIP). 
vi. The co-movement of capital gains on liabilities with exchange rates: the more does the exchange 
rate associated with liabilities depreciate as capital gains on liabilities fall, the less benefit will 
occur from lower capital gains on liabilities (the more will the negative effects from iv. counter 
the positive effects from i. and ii. on the NIIP). 
Table 2 lists each of these key variables and summarizes what characteristics of each would mitigate the 
negative effects of a domestic risk shock on current account vulnerabilities by transmitting wealth to the 
domestic economy. In other words, it describes what country characteristics provide this type of 
international risk sharing through changes in the NIIP. It also reports how each of the 10 OECD 
economies in our sample perform according to each of these characteristics, as well as on average.  
The table suggests that, on average, the international portfolios of these major OECD economies with 
flexible exchange rates have many characteristics that would support some automatic risk sharing in the 
face of heightened domestic risk. The average stock of liabilities as a percent of GDP was above 200% in 
recent years, having increased from an average of less than 80% in 1990 and around 150% in 2000. 
Moreover, on average 44% of the borrowing is in the form of equities, up from 25% in 1990 and 40% in 
2000. This suggests that when domestic risk increases and has the usual impact of causing domestic 
equity prices to decline, an increased portion of these losses are shared with foreign investors.  
Additional risk sharing also occurs through the currency denomination of assets and liabilities.  With 90% 
of assets denominated in foreign currency and only 43% of liabilities, any heightened domestic risk that 
causes these countries’ currencies to depreciate will – all else equal – generate an improvement in their 
NIIP simply because it increases the value of their international assets relative to the value of what they 
owe foreigners.37 This channel of risk sharing has likely increased over time, as the share of liabilities 
denominated in foreign currency has fallen from almost 60% in 1990 and 46% in 2000, while the share 
of assets denominated in foreign currency has stayed around 90%.  
While most of the countries’ international portfolio characteristics support some risk sharing, on 
average, other characteristics could at least partially counteract these effects. For example, the average 
positive correlations between the exchange rate and the rate of capital gains, as well as with the rate of 
return, suggests that exchange rate movements can partly offset the risk sharing from movements in 
rates of returns and capital gains on liabilities. Consider the 0.52 correlation between the exchange rate 
and capital gains on liabilities for the UK. Increased domestic risk tends to reduce the capital gains on UK 
liabilities, thereby improving the UK’s NIIP position (assuming everything else stays constant). The 
positive correlation between reduced capital gains and sterling, however, suggests that the currency 
would simultaneously weaken, thereby lessening this reduction in capital gains (as some liabilities are 
denominated in foreign currency) and partially counteracting the risk sharing. All in all, despite these 
currency “hedging effects”, these 10 OECD countries with flexible exchange rates appear, on average, to 
                                                          
37 Of course, if a country’s currency appreciates after an increase in domestic risk, then these effects would be reversed. The 
estimated currency denominations are based on Benetrix et al. (2015) and refer to 2012. 
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have international portfolios that could provide some cushion against heightened domestic risk – at 
least in terms of reducing vulnerabilities related to any current account deficits.  
There are noteworthy differences, however, between the individual countries in the group. For example, 
Switzerland has a number of characteristics that support a particularly high degree of international risk 
sharing after increased domestic risk: its high share of international liabilities to GDP (450%), high share 
of equities in liabilities (60%), high share of assets in foreign currency (95%), low share of liabilities in 
foreign currency (32%), and negative correlation between its exchange rate and foreign currency capital 
gains (-32%). Japan benefits less from international risk sharing after domestic shocks due to its: low 
share of international liabilities to GDP (104%), low share of equities in liabilities (37%), and lower share 
of assets in foreign currency (71%). The UK has some characteristics that should support a substantial 
degree of automatic risk sharing – such as its large stock of international liabilities (the highest in the 
sample at 558% of GDP) and 93% share of assets denominated in foreign currency (close to the sample 
average). But by other measures the UK would only have moderate risk sharing and less than the sample 
average, such as its 58% of liabilities denominated in foreign currency (compared to an average of 43%) 
and only 27% of liabilities in the form of equities (compared to an average of 44%). The UK’s exchange 
rate movements also tend to improve risk sharing through its negative correlation with foreign currency 
returns, but reduce risk sharing through its positive correlation with foreign currency capital gains.  
C. The Impact of Global Risk 
While the international portfolios of these 10 OECD economies with flexible exchange rates appear to 
provide some automatic risk sharing in the face of domestic risk shocks, what do they imply in the face 
of global risk shocks? Analyzing the effects of heightened global risk is more complicated than for 
domestic risk, however, because it requires incorporating two additional considerations.38 First, taking 
into account that some currencies are “safe havens” and appreciate in response to increased global risk, 
while others tend to depreciate. Second, the global risk shock affects not only capital gains and returns 
on foreign liabilities, but also on foreign assets.    
To assess which currencies are generally treated as a safe haven by investors, Figure 11 reports the 
correlations between the VIX and the currencies of the 10 OECD economies in our sample, plus the euro, 
over different time periods. Currencies treated as a safe haven generally have a positive correlation – 
reflecting the fact that their value increases when global risk increases (and vice versa). The figure shows 
that the dollar, yen and Swiss franc have consistently been treated as safe havens over each of these 
windows, while other currencies have not. The euro has showed characteristics of a safe haven during 
some periods – but not others – so for the analysis that follows we will only treat the dollar, yen and 
Swiss franc as safe havens.  
Next, we use the same framework as in the last section (and summarized in equation 11) to analyze how 
a global risk shock would be expected to impact key variables related to current account vulnerabilities 
and the NIIP, except now we extend the analysis for the additional effects on foreign assets, as well as 
differentiate between safe haven currencies and the rest. Many of the effects of global risk shocks are 
the same as for domestic risk shocks, so to simplify discussion, we will highlight the key differences in 
                                                          
38 Other considerations might also be relevant, such as if increased global risk generated a rush to safe assets globally and 
caused the return on debt liabilities (relative to the return on equity liabilities) to fall less than when domestic risk increases. To 
simplify the analysis, we abstract from this effect. 
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bold. More specifically, the impact of increased global risk on the current account and on the NIIP 
(incorporating the effects on investment income and valuation changes), will depend on:  
i. The initial stock of liabilities and assets: a greater stock of liabilities relative to assets will 
increase the shock’s impact on overall capital gains and returns and through exchange rate 
changes (leading to a greater reduction in payments abroad relative to payments received from 
abroad and greater reduction in the value of international liabilities relative to assets, improving 
the current account and NIIP).  
ii. The composition of the initial stock of liabilities and assets: the more risky are the liabilities 
relative to assets, the greater the impact on the rate of return and capital gains on these 
liabilities relative to assets (reducing payments abroad relative to those received from abroad, 
increasing net investment income, and improving the current account and NIIP). 
iii. The currency of denomination of assets: the more assets are denominated in foreign safe haven 
currencies, the more will the associated exchange rate depreciate – or the less will it appreciate 
if it is a safe haven - (increasing receipts from abroad, increasing net investment income, and 
improving the current account and NIIP).  
iv. The currency of denomination of liabilities: the more liabilities are denominated in foreign safe 
haven currencies, the more will the associated exchange rate depreciate – or the less will it 
appreciate if it is a safe haven - (increasing payments abroad, lowering net investment income, 
and deteriorating the current account and NIIP).  
v. The co-movement of returns on liabilities and assets with exchange rates: the more does the 
exchange rate on liabilities depreciate as the returns on liabilities fall, the less benefit will occur 
from lower returns on liabilities (the more will the negative effects from iv. counter the positive 
effects from i. and ii. on investment income, the current account and NIIP). But the more does 
the exchange rate related to assets depreciate as the returns on assets fall, the less will be the 
negative impact of lower returns on assets (the less will the negative effects from i. and ii. 
counter any positive effects from iii).  
vi. The co-movement of capital gains on liabilities and assets with exchange rates: the more does 
the exchange rate on liabilities depreciate as the rate of capital gains on liabilities fall, the less 
benefit will occur from lower capital gains on liabilities (the more will the negative effects from 
iv. counter the positive effects from i. and ii. on the NIIP). But the more does the exchange rate 
related to assets depreciate as the rate of capital gains on assets fall, the lower will be the 
negative impact of the fall in capital gains on the NIIP (the less will the negative effects from i. 
and ii. counter any positive effects from iii). 
These characteristics differ quite a bit across countries; countries have different quantities of assets 
relative to liabilities, hold different types of assets (with different shares of equity relative to debt), and 
invest using different currencies (with different shares in safe havens). Nonetheless, in an attempt to 
make these channels more concrete and provide some basis for comparisons, Table 3 repeats the 
analysis in Table 2, but for global (instead of domestic) risk. The table again describes what international 
portfolio characteristics mitigate the impact of global shocks through changes in the NIIP, and reports 
the average values for the same sample of 10 OECD economies with flexible exchange rates, as well as 
individual country characteristics.  
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The table suggests that, on average, these countries’ international portfolios have some characteristics 
that could partially mitigate the impact of heightened global risk on the NIIP. Other characteristics, 
however, do not, making the aggregate effects less clear than after heightened domestic risk.  For 
example, starting with the positives, 40% of assets are denominated in foreign safe haven currencies 
and only 24% of liabilities. Therefore, when global risk increases and safe-haven currencies appreciate, 
the value of international assets increases relative to liabilities, thereby boosting the NIIP and helping 
mitigate the wealth effects of the global risk shock. The higher correlation between exchange rates on 
assets and their rates of capital gains than that between exchange rates on liabilities and their rates of 
capital gains also implies that the exchange rate generally mitigates the fall in the NIIP after a global risk 
shock. Counteracting this effect, however, the countries hold fewer foreign liabilities than assets, on 
average, so that if these are hit identically by a global shock, their net foreign asset holdings decline, 
exacerbating the impact of the shock. Moreover, the smaller share of equity (relative to debt) for 
liabilities (relative to assets) further amplifies the negative effects of increased global risk on the NIIP.   
The averages cited in Table 3, however, again incorporate significant differences in international 
portfolios across countries. Countries such as the US, UK, Australia and New Zealand have larger 
liabilities relative to assets39, suggesting they tend to see improvements simply due to the stocks of their 
positions after global shocks. In contrast, countries such as Norway, Switzerland, and Japan have larger 
assets relative to liabilities, and are therefore more likely to be made worse off after a global shock 
simply due to the magnitudes of these positions. There are also substantial differences in the relative 
equity shares in liabilities relative to assets, with the US, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, Norway 
and Sweden more heavily exposed to equity in their liabilities, and therefore more likely to benefit from 
these compositional effects after global risk shocks (which tend to reduce the values of equities relative 
to debt).40 Most countries, however, have a substantially larger share of assets denominated in foreign 
safe-haven currencies than liabilities (with the smallest difference for Japan). This should increase the 
value of their assets relative to liabilities after an increase in global risk (which increases the value of 
safe-haven currencies), helping mitigate the wealth effects of the shock.41  
D. The Magnitudes: Global and Domestic Risk Shocks and Current Account Vulnerabilities 
Tables 2 and 3 show that the international portfolios for a sample of OECD economies with flexible 
exchange rates have a number of characteristics that should help mitigate the negative impact of 
heightened domestic risk, and possibly heightened global risk, on international exposures. The tables do 
not, however, provide any information on the magnitude of any such risk sharing through these 
channels in practice, or the relative importance of different channels that work in opposing directions 
(especially after global risk shocks).  Therefore – as a final step to get a better sense of the magnitudes 
and relevance of the effects discussed in this section – we estimate an SVAR model to calculate how 
domestic and global risk shocks have affected international investment income and valuation changes 
over time. We focus on one country, the United Kingdom, which currently has a very large current 
account deficit that has raised concerns about the country’s vulnerability to various shocks.  
                                                          
39 Based on 2014 market valuations. Most countries report market valuations for all asset classes excluding FDI. We use Lane 
and Milesi-Ferreti (2007b) FDI stocks, valued at replacement cost, and update them for 2012-2014 using growth rates 
calculated from official statistics reported in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. 
40 Gourinchas, Rey and Truempler (2012) also highlight this impact of a greater share of equity in assets. 
41 It is not clear whether this channel has increased over time. The share of assets denominated in foreign safe haven currencies 
has fallen over time; but the share of liabilities denominated in safe haven currencies has also fallen. 
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In order to estimate a model that closely follows the framework in this paper, we will continue to focus 
on separate global and domestic risk shocks. To measure these risk shocks, we start with measures of 
UK uncertainty and global uncertainty reported in the indices constructed by Baker, Bloom and Davis 
(2015). These measures of uncertainty do not just capture exogenous changes in UK or global risk, 
however, but also other changes in the domestic or global environment (such as adverse demand 
shocks). These measures also move together to some degree (with a correlation of 0.65), reflecting the 
fact that certain shocks could affect both global and UK uncertainty. In order to identify and estimate 
exogenous risk shocks based on these measures of uncertainty, we therefore use an SVAR model 
combined with other macroeconomic data. This SVAR model is described in Appendix B, along with 
details on the identification assumptions and corresponding data. This framework yields uncorrelated 
UK and global risk shocks. Then we use these measures to estimate how exogenous domestic and global 
risk shocks will affect UK net international investment income and valuation changes on its international 
portfolio. 
Figures 12 and 13 show UK investment income and the valuation effects on its international portfolio, 
respectively, as well as the estimated historical contributions to these variables from the two risk shocks 
identified using our SVAR model. The contributions of the risk shocks typically move in the same 
direction as movements in international investment income and valuation changes. They also appear to 
explain a material portion of the movements in both variables. A substantial share of the variation is not 
explained by the risk shocks, but this is expected as we only focus on the impact of two, narrow types of 
shocks (from exogenous global and domestic risk), and we do not plot the impact of other fundamental 
shocks that affect investment income and valuation changes (such as from relative demand, supply, 
monetary policy, and exogenous exchange rate movements). More specifically, the UK risk shock 
accounts for around 15% of the forecast error variance of investment income and 14% of valuation 
changes. The global risk shock accounts for a slightly smaller proportion of the variance, around 12% for 
both investment income and valuation changes. Therefore, our model suggests that just over a quarter 
of the unpredicted variance of net international investment income and valuation changes can be 
attributed to the domestic and global risk shocks.  
But are these contributions to international investment income and the NIIP positive when risk 
increases, thereby mitigating the adverse impact of heightened risk on the UK economy? Or do they 
decrease national net wealth and exacerbate the real effects of higher uncertainty on the economy? The 
SVAR estimates indicate that the answer has depended on the source of that risk – whether it originates 
in the domestic economy or reflects a general increase in global risk.  
On one hand, an increase in domestic risk tends to have positive effects on the valuation of the UK’s 
international portfolio, largely reflecting the effects of the corresponding sterling depreciation and the 
currency composition of the UK’s international portfolio. The effects on net investment income tend to 
be smaller and less robust to different specifications. This suggests that the structure of the UK 
international portfolio facilitates international risk sharing after country-specific risk shocks through its 
effect on the NIIP. This effect can be seen in Figure 13 during 2012 and early 2013, which was a period 
when UK risk increased relative to global risk. Sterling depreciated, increasing the sterling value of UK 
foreign asset holdings, while having a much smaller impact on the value of UK liabilities (a smaller share 
of which is denominated in foreign currencies, as shown in Table 2). These effects, however, work in the 
opposite direction during periods of reduced UK risk. For example, in the second half of 2013 and 2014, 
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UK domestic risk fell and sterling appreciated, reducing the sterling value of UK foreign asset holdings 
and shifting wealth abroad.    
On the other hand, an increase in global risk has historically been associated with net valuation losses on 
the UK’s international portfolio and lower international investment income. Sterling tends to depreciate 
after heightened global risk, which should generate some positive valuation effect as occurred after a 
depreciation in response to heightened domestic risk. Heightened global risk, however, also generates 
an additional effect on the foreign currency returns on UK foreign assets, independent from any 
movements in the exchange rate. This effect through relative returns has been less favorable for the UK 
due to the composition of its assets and liabilities. More specifically, UK international assets have 
historically had a larger share of risky investments (such as FDI and portfolio equity) than UK 
international liabilities, such that the returns on UK assets abroad are likely to fall more than the returns 
on safer UK liabilities during periods of heightened global risk. This effect is evident in Figures 12 and 13 
in the period before the crisis from 2005 to 2007. Global risk was low, corresponding to higher capital 
gains and investment income flows on UK assets relative to that on UK liabilities, and thereby 
contributing to positive net valuation gains and net investment income surpluses. In contrast, when 
global risk increased sharply during the financial crisis, there was a negative impact on net valuation 
changes and investment income (as the UK’s riskier assets earned lower returns and underperformed its 
safer liabilities42).      
These SVAR results provide more detailed information on how the specific characteristics of a country’s 
international portfolio can affect its vulnerabilities related to the current account in the face of 
heightened domestic and global risk. The results show not only the net direction of these effects, but 
also give a rough sense of the magnitudes. For the UK, an increase in domestic risk leads to positive 
valuation effects on its international portfolio that help share the costs of heightened domestic 
uncertainty internationally in a meaningful way. An increase in global risk, however, generates negative 
valuation and return effects due to the composition of the UK’s international portfolio.  
 
IV. Conclusions 
Although current account deficits – even large ones – should not automatically imply country 
vulnerability, the historical and empirical evidence suggests that they are often not benign. They 
correspond to a greater reliance on investment and capital flows from abroad, thereby increasing a 
country’s vulnerability to anything that affects these capital flows or investor sentiment.  Sudden shifts 
in these capital flows can trigger difficult economic adjustments. In some cases, however, the factors 
affecting investor sentiment and the corresponding capital flows will also influence the current account 
and international investments, potentially aggravating or mitigating any related vulnerabilities. This 
paper developed a framework to evaluate these effects. It allows us to assess and better understand 
when a current account deficit is menacing, versus when it provides some mitigation against adverse 
shocks through international risk sharing. 
                                                          
42 For example, the UK entered the crisis with FDI holdings accounting for 14% of its total foreign assets, but only 9% of its 
foreign liabilities. In 2008, these FDI holdings generated a negative capital gain of 15%, whereas safer assets such as portfolio 
debt and other investments (mostly cross-border loans and deposits) generated positive capital gains of 7% and 14%, 
respectively. Since the UK held more of the worse-performing asset (FDI), the value of its net portfolio suffered from the 
increase in global risk that drove equity prices down. 
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Before developing this framework, the paper began by reviewing why current account deficits often 
generate concerns. Recent evidence suggests that key vulnerabilities reflect the financial components of 
the current account, despite the common shorthand of treating current account balances as 
synonymous with trade balances. A series of empirical decompositions for a sample of OECD economies 
shows that these financial components are increasingly important, and sometimes more important than 
trade, in explaining movements in current account balances and changes in net international borrowing 
positions. These financial components include changes in the valuations of a country’s international 
investments (“valuation effects”), as well as the income earned and paid on past cross-border 
investments (“investment income”). Although previous academic work has explored these valuation 
effects, little attention has been paid to the role of international investment income, or to the drivers 
and interactions of these financial factors. Understanding their determinants and dynamics is critical to 
understanding the vulnerabilities related to current account deficits.  
Therefore, we next developed a unified framework that decomposes these financial factors into four 
sets of variables determining their evolution: the existing stock of international assets and liabilities in a 
country’s portfolio, the composition of this portfolio (between more and less risky investments), the 
rates of returns and capital gains on this portfolio, and exchange rate movements. We showed that the 
relative importance of each of these variables differs across countries and time, reflecting both the 
characteristics of each country’s portfolio as well as the confluence of changes in markets around the 
world. But the decomposition also showed several noteworthy patterns – such as how the size of 
international asset positions has large and consistent effects over time, the importance of relative rates 
of return on international assets and liabilities in driving valuation effects and international investment 
income, and the effects of exchange rate movements. 
After developing this framework to better understand the drivers of current account balances and 
international investment positions, we extended the framework to evaluate the vulnerabilities related 
to current account deficits during periods of heightened risk and uncertainty. These are the periods that 
often correspond to sudden shifts in capital flows that make it more difficult to finance a current 
account deficit. These periods could reflect an increase in domestic risk (such as related to domestic 
political or economic uncertainty) or global risk (such as related to commodity price fluctuations, global 
economic uncertainty, or global financial conditions). We showed which characteristics of a country’s 
international investment portfolio tend to aggravate the negative impact of heightened risk and 
uncertainty on a country’s vulnerabilities, and which characteristics can mitigate these effects by shifting 
some of the adjustment costs abroad.  
While the framework developed in this paper can be applied to any country, we primarily focused on a 
sample of 10 OECD economies with flexible exchange rates. This includes a number of countries which 
currently have, or have had, large current account deficits. The sample allows us to highlight the role 
that exchange rate adjustments can play in the buildup – or unwinding – of any vulnerabilities. The 
examples also highlight the flexibility of this framework to analyze very diverse experiences across 
countries. Although some common patterns emerge for our sample of advanced economies – such as 
the potential for international sharing of idiosyncratic risks through currency movements – there is 
substantial heterogeneity in countries’ external portfolios and thereby how they are affected by 
heightened risk and uncertainty.  
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In order to more concretely show how this framework and the results can be applied to analyze a 
specific country’s vulnerability to certain events, the paper closes with a more detailed application to 
one country with a large current account deficit: the United Kingdom. This discussion helps tie together 
the various pieces of analysis developed through the paper and provides an indication of the magnitude 
of the various effects. The analysis provides several insights on the UK’s vulnerability related to its 
current account. First, changes in the UK’s international investment position have primarily 
corresponded to valuation adjustments in these investment positions (instead of trade balances), and 
the role of these valuation effects has increased over time. Second, changes in the UK’s current account 
since 2004 have been almost entirely driven by changes in international investment. Third, the increased 
role of financial fluctuations in determining the UK’s international investment position and current 
account is not surprising given the sharp increase in the UK’s gross international asset and liability 
positions; larger positions mean that even small changes in valuations and returns have larger effects. 
Fourth, positive international investment income flows and valuation effects have substantially 
improved the UK’s net international investment position over time. Fifth, the UK’s strong international 
investment income in the 2000s resulted primarily from the composition of its international investments 
(with a greater exposure to equity than debt) and a moderate boost from the relative returns earned 
abroad relative to those paid to foreigners. Finally, sterling’s movements have had a powerful effect on 
the valuation of UK international investments, with the effect positive during periods of sterling 
depreciation (such as during the 2008-2009 crisis) and negative during periods of sterling appreciation 
(such as during 2014).  
After understanding these key structural components and sensitivities of the UK international 
investment position, it is then possible to analyze how these components would be affected by 
increases in UK risk and global risk.  The UK has some characteristics that should support a substantial 
degree of automatic risk sharing after domestic shocks—such as its large stock of international liabilities 
(the highest in the sample at 558% of GDP) and 93% share of assets denominated in foreign currency. By 
other measures, however, the UK would only have moderate risk sharing and less than the sample 
average (such as its relatively high 58% of liabilities denominated in foreign currency and relatively low 
27% of liabilities in the form of equities). The UK’s exchange rate movements also tend to improve risk 
sharing through its negative correlation with foreign currency returns, but reduce risk sharing through 
its positive correlation with foreign currency capital gains. By most measures, the UK appears to be less 
well positioned to share risk internationally after an increase in global risk. An analysis quantifying the 
impact of these effects shows that changes in UK and global risk have explained a meaningful portion of 
changes in UK international investment income and investment positions over time.43 
This analysis should be read with several important caveats. First, the international financial data is far 
from perfect, so all empirical calculations and estimates should be interpreted as having a wide margin 
of error. Second, the analysis focused on understanding the vulnerabilities related to current account 
deficits that occur during periods of heightened risk and uncertainty. It did not incorporate the 
additional vulnerabilities and effects of heightened risk on an economy, such as through any effects of 
                                                          
43 The analysis does not account for other important effects of heightened risk on the broader economy, such as from currency 
depreciation, which is a key part of these financial effects and would in itself incur other adjustments. Carroll et al. (2011) and 
Case et al. (2013) estimate that changes in the valuation of international exposures have minimal impact on domestic incomes 
and growth in the UK and would therefore be unlikely to counteract the negative effects of heightened uncertainty on these 
domestic variables. Forbes, Hjortsoe and Nenova (2015) show how the source of the shock behind an exchange rate movement 
will determine its impact on import prices, inflation, and the broader economy. 
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delayed investment and consumption, or any additional effects on the real economy from the 
corresponding movements in financial markets. It also does not make any attempt to consider any 
effects of heightened risk on the liquidity or functioning of financial markets.44 Finally, the analysis 
focuses only on the financial vulnerabilities and immediate adjustments related to current accounts. It 
ignores the slower moving, but often important, adjustments that can occur through trade. 
With these caveats, the analysis clearly showed that any analysis of a country’s vulnerabilities related to 
current account deficits and international borrowing needs to prominently feature financial factors, 
drivers, and interactions. Although these effects vary across countries, a fairly straightforward and 
limited set of measurable characteristics of a country’s international investment portfolio can go a 
substantial way to understanding the dynamics of current accounts, international investment positions, 
and their related vulnerabilities. This framework showed that current account deficits are not 
automatically “menacing”. Instead, in countries with certain characteristics of their international 
portfolios (including many of the OECD economies analyzed in this paper), current account deficits can 
partially mitigate the negative impact of certain shocks (especially domestic risk shocks) through 
international risk sharing. Although this paper focuses on the potential benefits of this risk sharing to 
individual countries, future work could attempt to aggregate these effects and assess the benefits to the 
global economy from this type of risk sharing.45 
 
Appendix A: Decomposing Investment Income and Valuation Changes 
The decomposition of investment income, valuation changes, and overall changes in the NIIP shown in 
equations (6) through (8) shows that four sets of financial variables are important in understanding 
vulnerabilities related to current account deficits: the existing stock of international assets and liabilities, 
the exchange rate indices reflecting the currency composition of the country’s assets and liabilities, the 
composition of each asset and liability class (c), and the nominal rate of return and capital gains on last 
period’s foreign assets and liabilities. Using the framework in equations (6) through (8) to estimate the 
contribution of each of these variables, however, is not straightforward. Previous academic literature 
has taken two different directions, which we attempt to unify within the framework used in this paper. 
One strand of literature has focused on decomposing different countries’ net foreign returns into a 
return effect and a composition effect, (i.e. focusing on the �𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐� − �𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐� for each asset/liability and 
composition c in equation (7)). This literature, including Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Curcuru et al. 
(2008), has decomposed different countries’ net foreign returns into a return and a composition effect. 
The first captures whether a given country is paying more or less on its foreign liabilities than it receives 
on its assets of the same type. A positive net return effect has been described as a country’s “exorbitant 
privilege”. The composition effect, on the other hand captures whether a country’s international 
portfolio yields more based on the types of investments in its portfolio and not the returns for each 
type. For example, a country could have a higher average yield on its international portfolio because it 
                                                          
44 For a discussion of these risks, see Financial Policy Committee (2014). 
45 An extensive literature assesses the extent of international risk sharing (through measures such as the cross-country 
comovement in consumption and output growth) and found less risk sharing than optimal or would be expected given high 
levels of financial globalization. See Flood, Marion and Matsumoto (2012) and Kose, Prasad, Terrones (2007). One exception is 
Gourinchas et al. (2012), which documents the substantial risk sharing that occurred during the global financial crisis. 
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has a higher share of assets (than liabilities) in equities and FDI, which tend to yield more than bonds 
and cross-border bank loans and deposits. 
The second strand of literature has focused on the role of exchange rate adjustments, and especially 
how they can determine valuation changes based on the currency composition of assets and liabilities. 
This literature, led by Lane and Shambaugh (2010) and Benetrix, Lane and Shambaugh (2015), has 
pointed out that exchange rate movements play a role in valuation changes if a country has a nonzero 
initial net position or if the currency composition of its assets and liabilities differs. For instance, 
countries that issue much of their liabilities in their own currency (such as the US), but hold foreign 
assets denominated in other currencies, can benefit substantially from a depreciation. These exchange 
rate effects can exacerbate or mitigate the effects of certain shocks on a country’s external position. Not 
explicitly accounting for these exchange rate effects when constructing measures of the composition 
and return effects can make the latter two very volatile and less informative about the underlying 
structure of a country’s vulnerability.   
For our analysis, we unify these different approaches and build more closely on the framework 
developed in equations (6) through (8). This allows us to provide a decomposition of investment income 
and valuation changes into all four of the different financial determinants simultaneously (i.e. the 
existing stock of international assets and liabilities, differences in exchange rates across assets and 
liabilities, differences in the composition of these portfolios, and differences in returns and capital gains 
on these positions.) This more detailed decomposition, however, requires some additional calculations 
and assumptions.  
First, we begin by calculating the effect of the initial international stocks on investment income and on 
valuations effects, the “stock effect”. This effect captures any net income or valuation changes that the 
previous period net asset positions would have generated stripping out the impact resulting from assets 
and liabilities yielding different returns (both due to composition and return effects) and from exchange 
rate movements differing across assets and liabilities. The stock effect is thus computed assuming that 
rates of return and capital gains as well as exchange rate movements are identical across assets and 
liabilities. This yields an equation to derive the initial stock effect for the net investment income as:  
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐶_𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡 ≡ (𝐴𝑡−1 − 𝐿𝑡−1) �𝑟𝑡𝐴+𝑟𝑡𝐿2 � � 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴 + 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿 � .     (A1) 
The initial stock effect for valuation changes can, in turn, be written as: 
∆𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑡 ≡ (𝐴𝑡−1 − 𝐿𝑡−1) ∗ ��𝑘𝑔𝑡𝐴+𝑘𝑔𝑡𝐿2 � � 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴 + 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿 � + � 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴 + 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿 − 1��.  (A2) 
All the variables are defined as before46. The only notable difference is that, to simplify, these 
calculations use aggregated exchange rates and returns on assets and liabilities, denoted with subscript 
A or L, rather than the asset-class specific A,c or L,c. ER0 denotes the base period exchange rate.  
                                                          
46 When applying these decompositions to UK data, the foreign currency rates of return on assets are calculated from Balance 
of Payments and NIIP data as follows: 𝑟𝑡𝑆 = 𝐹𝑡𝑆∗𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡−1∗𝐸𝑅𝑡−1𝑆  and 𝑘𝑔𝑡𝐴 = 𝑆𝑡∗𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑆−𝑆𝑡−1∗𝐸𝑅𝑡−1𝑆 −𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑆∗𝐸𝑅𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡−1∗𝐸𝑅𝑡−1𝑆   . 𝑆𝑡is the stock of assets or liabilities 
in domestic currency; 𝐹𝑡𝑆 is the corresponding current account income flow and 𝐶𝐹𝑡𝑆 is the associated financial account capital 
flows. These definitions implicitly assume no hedging, i.e. every exchange rate movement is reflected fully in the stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities and the exchange rate impact on different stocks only differs depending on their currency 
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Second, the exchange rate effects on net investment income and valuation changes can be expressed as: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐶_𝑒𝑟𝑡 ≡ �𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝑡−12 � ∗ �𝑟𝑡𝐴+𝑟𝑡𝐿2 � ∗ � 1∆𝐸𝑅𝑡𝐴 − 1∆𝐸𝑅𝑡𝐿�,       (A3) 
∆𝑉𝐴𝐿_𝑒𝑟𝑡 ≡  �𝐴𝑡−1+𝐿𝑡−12 � ∗ ��𝑘𝑔𝑡𝐴+𝑘𝑔𝑡𝐿2 � ∗ � 1∆𝐸𝑅𝑡𝐴 − 1∆𝐸𝑅𝑡𝐿� + � 1∆𝐸𝑅𝑡𝐴 − 1∆𝐸𝑅𝑡𝐿��.   (A4) 
In line with previous literature we also compute the effect from the foreign currency excess yield and 
excess capital gain. These can be decomposed following the “exorbitant privilege” literature (see Habib, 
2010) into return and composition effects. To do so, define 𝛼𝑐,𝑡 as the share of a given asset c in a 
country’s total assets in period t, and 𝜆𝑐,𝑡 as the share of a given asset c in a country’s total assets in 
period t, holding the exchange rates associated with all asset classes fixed.  
The third channel, the composition effect, for net investment income and valuation changes is then: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐶_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 ≡ �𝐴𝑡−1+𝐿𝑡−12 �  ∑ [�𝛼𝑐,𝑡−1 − 𝜆𝑐,𝑡−1� ∗𝑐 �𝑟𝑐,𝑡𝐴 +𝑟𝑐,𝑡𝐿 �2 � 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 + 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐�]  , and   (A5) 
Δ𝑉𝐴𝐿_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑡 ≡ �𝐴𝑡−1+𝐿𝑡−12 �  ∑ [�𝛼𝑐,𝑡−1 − 𝜆𝑐,𝑡−1� ∗𝑐 �𝑘𝑔𝑐,𝑡𝐴 +𝑘𝑔𝑐,𝑡𝐿 �2 � 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 + 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐�]  .  (A6) 
Finally, the return effects for net investment income and valuations changes are then: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐶_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡 ≡ �𝐴𝑡−1+𝐿𝑡−12 �∑ [�𝑟𝑐,𝑡𝐴 − 𝑟𝑐,𝑡𝐿 � ∗𝑐 �𝛼𝑐,𝑡−1+𝜆𝑐,𝑡−1�2 � 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 + 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐�] , and  (A7) 
Δ𝑉𝐴𝐿_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡 ≡ �𝐴𝑡−1+𝐿𝑡−12 �∑ [�𝑘𝑔𝑐,𝑡𝐴 − 𝑘𝑔𝑐,𝑡𝐿 � ∗𝑐 �𝛼𝑐,𝑡−1+𝜆𝑐,𝑡−1�2 � 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐴,𝑐 + 12∆𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝐿,𝑐�] .  (A8) 
 
Appendix B: Estimating the impact of global and domestic risk shocks on UK international investment 
income and valuation changes 
We develop a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model to identify domestic and global risk 
shocks, differentiate them from other fundamental shocks, and study their effects on UK net 
international investment income and net valuation changes on its international portfolio. This appendix 
summarizes (i) the dataset from which structural shocks are extracted, (ii) the identification of those 
shocks, and (iii) the estimation of the model. 
(i) Data 
Our dataset includes eight macroeconomic and financial variables at quarterly frequency over the period 
1997Q1 – 2015Q3. The data and transformations used to construct these are summarized below: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
denomination. In reality, it is likely that some asset holdings are hedged against exchange rate movements and the exchange 
rate effect is not full, at least in the short run. We are not aware of any data to quantify these hedging effects, but if they are 
substantive, the decompositions here might be overestimating the effect of the exchange rate and as a result underestimating 
the effects of the foreign currency excess returns.  
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Net valuation changes: Difference between the change in the value of UK foreign assets minus gross 
capital outflows and the change in the value of UK foreign liabilities minus gross capital inflows; 
expressed as percent of nominal UK GDP. 
Net income balance: Difference between the investment income from UK foreign assets and UK foreign 
liabilities; expressed as percent of nominal UK GDP. 
Relative GDP growth: Quarterly real GDP growth in the UK minus quarterly real GDP growth in the rest 
of the world; weighted by the value of UK trade with each country. 
Relative inflation: Quarterly CPI inflation in the UK minus quarterly CPI inflation in the rest of the world; 
weighted by the value of UK trade with each country. 
Interest rate differential: Difference between one-year sterling instantaneous forward interest rates 
and a weighted average of one-year forward dollar and euro interest rates. The euro and dollar interest 
rates are aggregated using the shares of the Euro Area and the USA in the UK’s trade with these two 
regions.  
Sterling exchange rate index: Quarterly changes in the trade-weighted sterling effective exchange rate 
index. 
UK uncertainty index: Difference between UK and a weighted average of Euro Area and US news-based 
uncertainty indices developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) and available at 
www.policyuncertainty.com. The Euro Area and US uncertainty indices are aggregated using the shares 
of the Euro Area and the USA in the UK’s trade with these two regions. 
Global uncertainty index: Weighted average of Euro Area and US news-based uncertainty indices 
developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2015) and available at www.policyuncertainty.com. The Euro 
Area and US uncertainty indices are aggregated using the shares of the Euro Area and the USA in the 
UK’s trade with these two regions. 
(ii) Identification 
Using this set of variables, we identify six structural shocks with the short- and long-run zero restrictions 
and the sign restrictions shown in Table B1. More specifically, we identify relative supply, demand and 
monetary policy shocks, as well as an exchange rate shock and a domestic and global risk shock.  
The first three relative shocks are identified primarily through sign restrictions that are standard in the 
SVAR literature. In addition, we assume that relative demand and monetary policy shocks cannot affect 
long-term relative output. Next, we also use standard sign restrictions to identify an exogenous 
exchange rate shock, which also has no effect on relative long-term output. In addition, we assume that 
the two uncertainty measures do not react to exchange rate shocks in the short- or the long-run to 
exclude any exchange rate movements that are driven by changes in risk captured in the UK and global 
uncertainty measures.  
To differentiate between the first three fundamental shocks, which can affect uncertainty, and genuine 
exogenous increases in risk, we assume that changes in uncertainty driven by the two risk shocks only 
lead to changes in relative output with a lag. Finally, to separately identify a UK and a global risk shock, 
we assume that global uncertainty is unaffected by higher UK risk and that UK uncertainty does not 
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increase by more than global uncertainty in response to higher global risk. In addition, an increase in UK 
uncertainty leads to a sterling depreciation. 
Table B1: SVAR shock identification scheme 
Shocks: 
Relative 
supply 
Relative 
demand 
Relative 
monetary 
policy 
Exchange 
rate 
Domestic 
risk 
Global 
risk 
Short-run restrictions 
Net valuation changes 
      Net income balance 
      Relative GDP growth - + + 
 
0 0 
Relative inflation + + + + 
  Interest rate differential 
 
+ - + 
  Sterling exchange rate index 
 
+ - - - 
 UK uncertainty index 
   
0 + 0 
Global uncertainty index 
   
0 0 + 
Long-run restrictions 
Net valuation changes 
      Net income balance 
      Relative GDP growth 
 
0 0 0 
  Relative inflation 
      Interest rate differential 
      Sterling exchange rate index 
      UK uncertainty index 
   
0 
 
0 
Global uncertainty index 
   
0 0 
  
(iii) Estimation 
We estimate the model using Bayesian methods with standard Minnesota priors47. We include two lags 
of the endogenous variables but impose the short-run restrictions in Table B1 for one period only, i.e. on 
the contemporaneous effect of the structural shocks. The combination of sign, short-run and long-run 
zero restrictions outlined above is imposed using the algorithm suggested by Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2010) 
and extended by Binning (2013) for under-identified models. The historical decompositions and forecast 
error variance decomposition results reported in this paper refer to the average values from the final 
1,000 repetitions of a Gibbs sampling procedure.  
 
 
  
                                                          
47 This prior, proposed by Litterman (1986), assumes each variable follows a random walk process and is independent from the 
other endogenous variables in the model. The hyperparameter values used here are as follows: λ1=0.2, λ2=0.5, λ3=1, 
λ4=10,000. 
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Figure 1: Current account balances of selected 
Asian economies in 1996 
Figure 2: Change in US dollar exchange rate 
between 1 May and 30 June 2013 
 
Note: Red (solid and patterned): countries which experienced an average 
currency depreciation of at least 10% in 1997 and 1998; 
Patterned: countries which also received an IMF package. 
Source: Datastream, IMF International Financial Statistics and World 
Economic Outlook, and own calculations. 
 
Note: Countries coloured in black ended 2012 with a current account 
deficit; those in red had a surplus. 
Source: WM/Reuters, IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF World 
Economic Outlook and own calculations. 
 
 
Figure 3: World financial assets and liabilities (% of world GDP) 
 
Note: Sample includes all countries with data on financial assets and liabilities going back to 1970. Debt includes portfolio debt 
and bank stocks. 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007b), IMF International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook, and own 
calculations. 
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Figure 4: Ratios of the variances in trade, primary income and valuation changes to the 
overall NIIP variance(a) 
(a) 1980 - 2014 
 
(b) 2004 - 2014 
 
(a) We calculate the standard deviations of each country’s trade and primary income balances, net valuation changes and overall NIIP changes 
and use these to construct ratios of the standard deviation of each of the first three terms to the standard deviation of the last one. Figure 4 
plots the simple unweighted average of these ratios across countries. 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007b), IMF International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook, and own calculations. 
 
 
Figure 5: Largest current account imbalances and their composition (2013-14 averages) 
 
Note: The sample includes all countries with available data and average 2013-14 GDP of at least $100bn. 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook and own calculations. 
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Figure 6: Ratios of the variances in trade, primary and secondary income to the current 
account variance(a) 
(a) 1980 - 2014 
 
 
(b) 2004 – 2014 
 
 
(a) We calculate the standard deviations of each country’s trade, primary and secondary income balances as well as the standard deviation of 
the overall current account balance. We then use these to construct ratios of the standard deviation of each of the first three terms to the 
standard deviation of the last one. Figure 6 plots the simple unweighted average of these ratios across countries. 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook and own calculations. 
 
Figure 7: Ten-year rolling correlation of current account balances with trade and primary 
income balances(a) for 10 OECD economies 
(a) UK 
 
(b) US 
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(c) Australia 
 
(d) Canada 
 
(e) Japan 
 
(f) Korea 
 
(g) New Zealand 
 
(h) Norway 
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(i) Sweden 
 
(j) Switzerland 
 
 
(a) The net trade, primary income and current account balances are all expressed as percentages of nominal GDP. 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook and own calculations. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: NIIP and accumulated current account, trade, primary income balances and 
valuation changes over time for 10 OECD economies 
(a) UK 
 
 
 
(b) US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
(c) Australia 
 
(d) Canada 
 
(e) Japan 
 
(f) Korea 
 
(g) New Zealand 
 
(h) Norway 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
(i) Sweden 
 
(j) Switzerland 
 
Note: The accumulated current account and valuation changes sum up to the NIIP. The accumulated current account comprises the 
accumulated trade and primary income balances, as well as the accumulated secondary income balances (not shown here). For each country, 
the accumulation of current account and trade balances starts using the first year’s NIIP, while the accumulation of valuation changes and 
income begins with a zero initial value. This assumption is necessary in order to decompose the level of the NIIP rather than its change since the 
first period. 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007b) and own calculations. 
 
 
Figure 9: Sterling exchange rate indices 
 
Source: Own calculations, using data from Benetrix et al. (2015), IMF International Financial Statistics, 
 and Datastream. 
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Figure 10: Breakdown of investment income and valuation changes in 10 OECD economies 
Income balance decomposition Valuation change decomposition 
(a) UK 
 
 
 
 
(b) US 
 
 
 
 
(c) Australia 
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Income balance decomposition Valuation change decomposition 
(d) Canada 
 
 
 
 
(e) Japan 
 
 
 
(f) Korea 
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Income balance decomposition Valuation change decomposition 
(g) New Zealand 
 
 
 
 
(h) Norway 
 
 
 
 
(i) Sweden 
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Income balance decomposition Valuation change decomposition 
(j) Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations, using data from Benetrix et al. (2015), IMF International Financial Statistics, and Datastream. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Correlations between changes in US VIX index and nominal effective exchange 
rates for 10 OECD economies 
 
Source: Bloomberg, Bank for International Settlements and own calculations. 
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Figure 12: UK investment income balance and contributions from  
domestic and global risk shocks 
 
 
Figure 13: UK valuation changes and contributions from  
domestic and global risk shocks 
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Table 1: Correlations of international investment income and valuation changes with their determinants 
Correlations 
of… Investment balance with: Valuation changes with: 
  
Initial stock 
effect 
Exchange 
rate effect 
Composition 
effect 
Return 
effect 
Initial stock 
effect 
Exchange 
rate 
effect 
Composition 
effect 
Return 
effect 
UK -0.19 -0.14 0.59 0.76 -0.50 0.25 -0.33 0.72 
US -0.58 0.18 0.78 0.84 -0.60 -0.04 0.31 0.89 
Australia 0.76 0.27 0.27 0.74 0.79 -0.25 -0.28 0.54 
Canada 0.71 -0.28 0.80 0.24 -0.12 0.25 0.28 0.71 
Japan 0.83 0.18 0.15 0.88 0.34 0.30 0.03 0.70 
Korea -0.05 -0.06 0.58 0.70 0.64 0.25 0.22 0.53 
New Zealand 0.74 -0.20 0.55 0.56 0.25 0.51 0.47 0.57 
Norway 0.93 0.08 -0.81 0.76 0.79 0.66 0.35 0.67 
Sweden 0.84 -0.34 0.25 0.89 0.28 0.46 -0.01 0.41 
Switzerland 0.37 0.34 0.20 0.79 0.10 -0.13 -0.33 0.72 
AVERAGE 0.44 0.00 0.34 0.71 0.20 0.23 0.07 0.65 
MEDIAN 0.73 0.01 0.41 0.76 0.26 0.25 0.12 0.68 
AVERAGE of 
absolute 
correlations 
0.60 0.21 0.50 0.71 0.44 0.31 0.26 0.65 
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Table 2. Characteristics Determining the Impact of a Domestic Risk Shock 
Variables 
Determining the 
NIIP Impact 
Risk sharing is 
higher … Statistics 
Un
ite
d K
in
gd
om
 
Un
ite
d S
ta
te
s 
Au
str
ali
a 
Ca
na
da
 
Ja
pa
n 
Ko
re
a 
Ne
w 
Ze
ala
nd
 
No
rw
ay
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Sw
itz
er
lan
d 
AV
ER
AG
E 
M
ED
IA
N 
Quantity of 
liabilities 
... the higher the 
stock of foreign 
liabilities 
Liabilities/GDP 558% 170% 156% 154% 104% 71% 133% 164% 246% 450% 221% 160% 
Composition of 
international 
liabilities 
…. the riskier are 
liabilities, i.e. the 
higher is the 
proportion of 
equity liabilities 
relative to debt 
liabilities 
Share of equity in 
liabilities 27% 43% 43% 51% 37% 57% 43% 34% 41% 60% 44% 43% 
Currency 
denomination of 
international assets 
… the higher the 
proportion of 
assets 
denominated in 
foreign currency 
Assets 
denominated in 
foreign currency 
93% 68% 90% 96% 71% 100% 100% 100% 87% 95% 90% 94% 
Currency 
denomination of 
international 
liabilities 
… the lower the 
proportion of 
liabilities 
denominated in 
foreign currency 
Liabilities 
denominated in 
foreign currency 
58% 16% 43% 34% 40% 44% 61% 64% 39% 32% 43% 42% 
Hedging ability of 
the exchange rate 
with respect to 
capital gains on 
liabilities 
… the less does 
the exchange rate 
associated with 
liabilities co-move 
with their capital 
gains 
Correlation 
between 
exchange rate 
and foreign 
currency capital 
gains on liabilities 
0.52 0.26 -0.12 0.30 0.06 0.45 0.84 0.23 0.31 -0.32 0.26 28% 
Hedging ability of 
the exchange rate 
with respect to 
returns on liabilities 
… the less does 
the exchange rate 
associated with 
liabilities co-move 
with their rate of 
return 
Correlation 
between 
exchange rate 
and foreign 
currency return 
on liabilities 
-0.14 -0.14 0.28 0.29 -0.39 0.28 0.16 0.22 0.26 0.20 0.10 21% 
Note: The correlation between exchange rates and rates of return and capital gains are based on the contribution of rates of return to investment income and the contribution of rates of capital 
gains to NIIP respectively. 
Table 3. Characteristics Determining the Impact of a Global Risk Shock  
Variables Determining 
the NIIP Impact 
Deterioration of financial 
position less pronounced… Statistics 
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m
 
Un
ite
d S
ta
te
s 
Au
str
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a 
Ca
na
da
 
Ja
pa
n 
Ko
re
a 
Ne
w 
Ze
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nd
 
No
rw
ay
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Sw
itz
er
lan
d 
AV
ER
AG
E 
M
ED
IA
N 
Quantity of assets and 
liabilities 
… the higher the stock of 
liabilities relative to assets 
Assets/GDP: 527% 140% 102% 162% 169% 76% 73% 305% 243% 553% 235% 166% 
Liabilities/GDP: 558% 170% 156% 154% 104% 71% 133% 164% 246% 450% 221% 160% 
Composition of 
liabilities relative to 
assets 
… the riskier are liabilities 
relative to assets i.e. the 
higher is the proportion of 
equity relative to debt 
liabilities compared to equity 
relative to debt assets 
Equity/debt in assets:  0.37 0.77 0.76 1.06 0.58 1.34 0.74 0.51 0.7 1.51 83% 75% 
Equity/debt in  
liabilities: 0.38 1.99 1.55 2.89 0.63 1.45 1.44 1.28 1.4 1.13 141% 142% 
Currency 
denomination of 
international assets 
… the higher the proportion of 
assets denominated in foreign 
safe haven currency 
Assets denominated in 
USD, CHF and JPY 43% 9% 47% 62% 39% 63% 48% 36% 26% 30% 40% 41% 
Currency 
denomination of 
international liabilities 
… the lower the proportion of 
liabilities denominated in 
foreign safe haven currency 
Liabilities denominated 
in USD, CHF and JPY 26% 2% 29% 30% 35% 37% 34% 19% 13% 10% 24% 28% 
Hedging ability of the 
exchange rate with 
respect to capital 
gains on assets and 
liabilities 
… the lower is the co-
movement between the 
exchange rate associated with 
liabilities and their capital 
gains relative to the co-
movement between the 
exchange rate associated with 
assets and their capital gains 
Correlation between 
exchange rate and 
foreign currency capital 
gains on assets 
0.56 0.31 0.07 0.37 0.32 0.52 0.66 0.06 0.44 0.34 0.36 0.36 
Correlation between 
exchange rate and 
foreign currency capital 
gains on liabilities 
0.52 0.26 -0.12 0.30 0.06 0.45 0.84 0.23 0.31 -0.32 0.26 0.28 
Hedging ability of the 
exchange rate with 
respect to returns on 
assets and liabilities 
… the lower is the co-
movement between the 
exchange rate associated with 
liabilities and their returns 
relative to the co-movement 
between the exchange rate 
associated with assets and 
their returns 
Correlation between 
exchange rate and 
foreign currency return 
on assets 
-0.07 -0.17 0.26 0.29 0.04 0.37 0.45 0.19 0.34 0.12 0.18 0.22 
Correlation between 
exchange rate and 
foreign currency return 
on liabilities 
-0.14 -0.14 0.28 0.29 -0.39 0.28 0.16 0.22 0.26 0.20 0.10 0.21 
Note: The correlation between exchange rates and rates of return and capital gains are based on the contribution of rates of return to investment income and the contribution of rates of capital gains to 
NIIP respectively. 
 
